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IF PAST IS PROLOGUE, THEN THE FUTURE
IS BLEAK: CONTRACTS, COVID–19, AND THE
CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES DOCTRINES
by: Danielle Kie Hart*
ABSTRACT
At the heart of most of the systemic problems currently confronting individuals and businesses as a result of the COVID–19 pandemic is quite literally a
contract. Housing. Insurance. Food. Health care. Child care. Employment.
Manufacturing. Construction. Supply chains. You name it. Contracts are implicated everywhere. So make no mistake: How contract law addresses these
ostensibly private contracts will have profound social consequences. If the past
really is prologue, then the future is indeed bleak. The empirical study conducted for this Article establishes what the conventional wisdom has claimed
for the last 70 years. More specifically, the empirical study here shows that the
common law’s changed circumstances doctrines (“CCDs”)—namely, impossibility, impracticability of performance, and frustration of purpose—will generally not excuse a party from performing his obligations under a contract,
regardless of the changed circumstance he alleges. Contrary to all the CCD
literature that addresses this issue, this Article makes the unconventional argument that the CCDs should be more broadly available, meaning they should
be more successful in excusing contract performance when triggered by catastrophic circumstances. And unlike the rest of the field, which focuses on the
CCDs themselves, this Article argues that to effectively address the allocation
of unforeseen risks in general and catastrophic risks like a pandemic in particular, we must reframe the legal approach to contract formation. From there,
given that the solution to the changed circumstances problem preferred by
courts and commentators is an explicit risk-allocation term in the parties’ contract, the solution proposed in this Article to the risk-allocation problem literally suggests itself. A risk-and-loss-allocation clause should be mandated in
most contracts as a part of contract formation. The type of risk-and-loss-allocation clause and how the clause would work would depend on whether the
contract is co-drafted or adhesive. Generally, the inclusion of a risk-and-lossallocation clause would facilitate transactions and encourage contracting by
ensuring that contracts remain efficient and predictable. The main difference
between the risk-and-loss-allocation clause proposed here and existing contract law, of course, is who ends up bearing all the risk and loss occasioned by
the catastrophic changed circumstance. To be clear, if nothing changes and
our approach to contract formation remains the same as it is right now, then
all of the risk and all of the attendant loss will generally be left to lie where it
falls—namely, on the party trying to get out of the contract because of the
https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V9.I2.2
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changed circumstances—and this will be the result regardless of the legal theory used to justify (or demonize) the CCDs or any changes made to the doctrines themselves. But if we finally acknowledge the public aspects of contracts
and contract law, namely, that they do in fact produce social consequences
that extend beyond the individual contract and contracting parties, then contracts and contract law may well be part of the solutions to some of the most
pressing problems currently confronting American society now and into the
future.
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INTRODUCTION

In December 2019, word first started trickling out about a new virus
in China.1 By January 20, 2020, the United States reported its first case
of the virus that would later be called COVID–19.2 By the end of the
month, the World Health Organization declared a global health emergency.3 And by the end of March 2020, more than half the U.S. population was under stay-at-home orders issued by state governors.4 Not
long after that, reports started pouring in from across the country:
global supply chains were completely upended, leading to disruptions
and shortages;5 thousands of suppliers across different industries were
devastated as customers cut production or closed shop;6 businesses
1. See Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html
[https://perma.cc/R6PV-NVHW].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Rosie Perper, Sarah Al-Arshani & Holly Secon, More Than Half of the US
Population Is Now Under Orders to Stay Home—Here’s a List of Coronavirus
Lockdowns in US States and Cities, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 31, 2020, 11:57 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/states-cities-shutting-down-bars-restaurants-concerts-curfew-2020-3 [https://perma.cc/MNX4-GM6L].
5. Jeff Karoub, Ravi Anupindi: COVID-19 Shocks Food Supply Chain, Spurs
Creativity and Search for Resiliency, U. MICH. NEWS (Apr. 29, 2020), https://
news.umich.edu/covid-19-shocks-food-supply-chain-spurs-creativity-and-search-forresiliency/ [https://perma.cc/W8B8-V4BH].
6. Tom Linton & Bindiya Vakil, It’s Up to Manufacturers to Keep Their Suppliers
Afloat, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 14, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/its-up-to-manufacturers-to-keep-their-suppliers-afloat [https://perma.cc/XNM5-TBZJ].
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were failing to pay their rent,7 closing their stores,8 and furloughing
their employees;9 homeowners could not pay their mortgages;10 renters could not pay rent, let alone all their other bills;11 airlines, cruise
ships, and hotels were refusing to issue refunds;12 and credit card companies and other lenders13 were contemplating the likelihood of massive defaults.14
As of January 10, 2022, there were 60,240,751 confirmed
COVID–19 cases in the United States, and 835,302 Americans lost
their lives because of a virus that has yet to be controlled.15 Notwithstanding these mind-boggling and heart-breaking numbers, news outlets have been reporting for some time now that the official tallies
significantly undercount the actual number of cases and deaths that
COVID–19 has caused in the United States.16
7. Jordan Valinsky, Cheesecake Factory Tells Its Landlords It Won’t Be Able to
Pay April Rent, CNN BUS., https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/26/business/cheesecake-factory-april-rent-coronavirus/index.html (Mar. 26, 2020, 1:13 PM) [https://perma.cc/
5F5X-CUCY]; see also Konrad Putzier & Esther Fung, Businesses Can’t Pay Rent.
That’s a Threat to the $3 Trillion Commercial Mortgage Market, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24,
2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/businesses-cant-pay-rent-thats-a-threatto-the-3-trillion-commercial-mortgage-market-11585051201 [https://perma.cc/D4JY5DDD].
8. Jordan Valinsky, Bed Bath & Beyond Is Laying Off 2,800 Employees, CNN
BUS., https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/26/investing/bed-bath-beyond-layoffs (Aug. 26,
2020, 9:07 AM) [https://perma.cc/Y9PR-7M2V].
9. Abha Bhattarai & Rachel Siegel, Macy’s Is Furloughing Most of Its 125,000
Employees Amid Prolonged Coronavirus Shutdown, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/03/30/macys-furloughs-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/6RM5-3LQR].
10. Diana Olick, Potential Wave of Mortgage Delinquencies Could Bankrupt the
Payment System, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/23/coronavirus-us-potentialwave-of-mortgage-delinquencies-could-bankrupt-payment-system.html (Mar. 23,
2020, 5:28 PM) [https://perma.cc/D4KU-34P6].
11. Eric Morath & Rachel Feintzeig, ‘I Have Bills I Have to Pay.’ Low-Wage
Workers Face Brunt of Coronavirus Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2020, 11:58 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/i-have-bills-i-have-to-pay-low-wage-workers-face-bruntof-coronavirus-crisis-11584719927 [https://perma.cc/2NFG-LY78].
12. David Lazarus, Column, No Coronavirus Refund but Credit for a Future
Cruise? Are You Kidding?, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://
www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-03-31/column-coronavirus-cruise-lines [https://
perma.cc/5FCN-WBUX].
13. W. E. Messamore, The Housing Market Crash’s First Victims Won’t Be Homeowners, CCN, https://www.ccn.com/the-housing-market-crashs-first-victims-wont-behomeowners (Sept. 23, 2020, 1:46 PM) [https://perma.cc/QkX2-UZRS].
14. Matt Egan, Credit Card CEO Warns of Dark Times When the $600 Unemployment Benefit Expires, CNN BUS., https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/22/investing/creditcard-debt-synchrony-unemployment (July 22, 2020, 1:57 PM) [https://perma.cc/M47DA656] (Defaults were particularly likely after the forbearance periods granted by the
credit card industry and the $600-a-week unemployment benefits ended.).
15. United States COVID-19 Cases, Deaths, and Laboratory Testing (NAATs) by
State, Territory, and Jurisdiction, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases_casesper100klast7days (Jan. 1, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/8QH7-VCPC].
16. See, e.g., Berkeley Lovelace, Jr., Official U.S. Coronavirus Death Toll Is ‘A
Substantial Undercount’ of Actual Tally, Yale Study Finds, CNBC, https://
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In addition to the mounting death toll and long-term health consequences to survivors, the havoc the COVID–19 pandemic is wreaking
on the American economy is staggering. A few numbers illustrate the
extent of the damage: “The U.S. economy contracted at an annualized
pace of 32.9% in the second quarter [of 2020], . . . the sharpest since at
least the late 1940s.”17 Economists concluded as early as May 2020
that more than 100,000 small businesses had already closed permanently since the pandemic erupted in March.18 According to the same
survey, 2% of small businesses were simply gone.19 The pandemic has
produced the highest unemployment rates in the country since the
Great Depression.20 More than 50 million Americans were still out of
work at the end of July 2020, and over a million people filed new
unemployment claims every week, except one, since March.21 As a
result of being laid off, over 5.4 million people lost their health insurance.22 Further, “[a]t least 11 million renters have fallen behind on
www.cnbc.com/2020/07/01/official-us-coronavirus-death-toll-is-a-substantial-undercount-of-actual-tally-new-yale-study-finds.html (July 2, 2020, 9:11 AM) [https://
perma.cc/D7CE-88SJ]; Excess Deaths Associated with COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covid19/excess_deaths.
htm (Sept. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8EC5-JQ97]; Angela Betsaida B. Laguipo, Official U.S. Tallies Likely Undercount COVID-19 Deaths, NEWS MED. (July 3, 2020),
https://www.news-medical.net/news/20200703/Official-UStallies-likely-undercountCOVID-19-deaths.aspx [https://perma.cc/X5PJ-LLW7]; Pien Huang, Fauci Says U.S.
Death Toll Is Likely Higher. Other COVID-19 Stats Need Adjusting, Too, NPR (May
13, 2020, 12:05 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/05/13/854873605/
fauci-says-u-s-death-toll-is-likely-higher-other-covid-stats-need-adjusting-too [https://
perma.cc/T5UU-J2CN].
17. William Watts, This ‘Dire’ Economic Situation ‘Deserves To Be Called a Depression—A Pandemic Depression’, MKT. WATCH, https://www.marketwatch.com/
story/coronavirus-collapse-is-nothing-less-than-a-depression-a-pandemic-depressionwarn-top-economists-11596728170 (Aug. 6, 2020, 4:07 PM) [https://perma.cc/GJ587NY5].
18. Heather Long, Small Business Used to Define America’s Economy. The Pandemic Could Change That Forever, WASH. POST (May 12, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/12/small-business-used-define-americaseconomy-pandemic-could-end-that-forever/ [https://perma.cc/UG7A-YFHQ].
19. Id.
20. Steven Brown, The COVID-19 Crisis Continues to Have Uneven Economic
Impact by Race and Ethnicity, URB. INST.: URB. WIRE (July 1, 2020), https://
www.urban.org/urban-wire/covid-19-crisis-continues-have-uneven-economic-impactrace-and-ethnicity [https://perma.cc/JE4Z-3T9V].
21. There were more than 1,000,000 unemployment claims for nineteen weeks in a
row. Paul Wiseman, More Than 1 Million Americans File for Unemployment, Again,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 27, 2020), https://apnews.com/383eb8856eda415
ed3a3b17894be035f#:~:text=the%20Labor%20Department%20reported%20Thursday,late%20March%2C%20an%20unprecedented%20streak [https://perma.cc/
Y5ZX-A4CS]; Nick Routley, Charts: The Economic Impact of COVID-19 in the U.S.
So Far, VISUAL CAPITALIST (July 31, 2020), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/economi
c-impact-of-covid-h1-2020/ [https://perma.cc/565Y-BMBX].
22. Annie Nova, 5.4 Million Americans Have Lost Their Health Insurance. What to
Do If You’re One of Them, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/14/one-of-the-millions-of-newly-uninsured-americans-what-to-do-next.html (July 14, 2020, 1:54 PM)
[https://perma.cc/HZM9-TQ58].
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rent[,] and some 3.6 million households could face evictions in the
coming months.”23
Notwithstanding the widespread and across-the-board devastation
that COVID–19 is inflicting, it is also agonizingly clear that the pandemic’s death toll and economic wreckage disproportionately affects
African Americans, Latinos, and Indigenous communities.24 People of
color are at increased risk of getting sick and dying from
COVID–19.25 According to the CDC, as of July 16, 2021, the death
rate for American Indians and Alaskan Natives is 2.4 times higher
than the death rate for whites; for African Americans the death rate is
2.0 times higher, and for Hispanics/Latinx people the death rate is 2.3
times higher.26 Much of the disparity in these healthcare outcomes is
now widely acknowledged as the result of long-standing systemic
health and social inequality.27
Moreover, according to the Pew Research Center, 61% of Hispanic
Americans and 44% of Black Americans reported in April 2020 that
either they or someone in their household had lost a job or wages
because of the pandemic, compared to 38% of white adults.28 The
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities reported that one in five adult
renters were behind on their rent for the week ending July 5, 2021, but
the rates for Black (24%) and Latino (18%) renters were significantly
higher than for white (11%) renters.29 Black and Hispanic adults were
23. Clifford Colby & Dale Smith, The Federal Eviction Moratorium Is Over. What
Renters Need to Know, CNET, https://www.cnet.com/personal-finance/eviction-crisisrenters-still-have-one-protection-left-until-monday-aug-24/ (Aug. 29, 2021, 9:00 AM)
[https://perma.cc/BU4N-6AEL].
24. Tracking the COVID-19 Recession’s Effects on Food, Housing, and Employment Hardships, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/tracking-the-covid-19-recessions-effects-on-foodhousing-and (Aug. 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/RVQ9-N9YP] [hereinafter Tracking the
COVID-19 Recession’s Effects]; Tiffany N. Ford, Sarah Reber & Richard V. Reeves,
Race Gaps in COVID-19 Deaths Are Even Bigger Than They Appear, BROOKINGS
(June 16, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/16/race-gaps-incovid-19-deaths-are-even-bigger-than-they-appear/ [https://perma.cc/T997-9HYK].
25. See, e.g., Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority
Groups, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html (Apr. 19, 2021)
[hereinafter Health Equity Considerations]; Too Many Black Americans Are Dying
from COVID-19, SCI. AM. (Aug 1, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
too-many-black-americans-are-dying-from-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/KBT3-V7X2].
26. Risk for COVID-19 Infection, Hospitalization, and Death By Race/Ethnicity,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/covid-data/investigations-discovery/hospitalization-death-by-race-ethnicity.html
(July 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/MC9G-Q9Y8].
27. See, e.g., Health Equity Considerations, supra note 25; Too Many Black Americans Are Dying from COVID-19, supra note 25.
28. Mark Hugo Lopez, Lee Rainie & Abby Budiman, Financial and Health Impacts of COVID-19 Vary Widely by Race and Ethnicity, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 5,
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/05/financial-and-health-impacts-of-covid-19-vary-widely-by-race-and-ethnicity/ [https://perma.cc/A2QU-LKRJ].
29. Tracking the COVID-19 Recession’s Effects, supra note 24.
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also more likely than their white counterparts to say that they could
not pay some of their bills or could only make partial payments in
April.30 The Urban Institute’s July 2020 research indicated that more
than twice as many Black (37.4%) and Hispanic adults (39.3%) were
food insecure as white adults (17.6%),31 none of which is surprising
given the employment and wage data.
Clearly, the COVID–19 pandemic’s effects in the United States are
systemic—they affect countless individuals and businesses from every
region of the country, every sector of the economy, and every part of
American society. Systemic effects unquestionably require a systemic
response from the State, with the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act32 being just one example.
But overlooked if not ignored amid this crisis is the role that contracts and contract law play in all this. A contract is quite literally at
the heart of most of the systemic problems currently confronting individuals and businesses. Housing. Insurance. Food. Health care. Child
care. Employment. Manufacturing. Construction. Supply chains. You
name it. Contracts are implicated everywhere. And given the headlines, we all know what is coming down the pike as everyone, individuals and businesses alike, tries to sort through the ruin that
COVID–19 continues to leave in its wake and assess the impact that
the pandemic will ultimately have on their day-to-day existence if not
long-term survival.
Two questions are thus posed by the pandemic for contract law—
both of which this Article addresses. The first question is descriptive:
Does contract law generally provide any relief to people and entities
who find themselves parties to contracts that, when the time set for
performance arrives, look very different from the contracts they originally entered into? This question specifically triggers an examination
of contract law’s changed circumstances doctrines (“CCDs”)—
namely, impossibility, impracticability of performance, and frustration
of purpose—to predict how contract law will address the particular
“changed circumstance” known as the COVID–19 pandemic. The second question is normative: Should contract law make legal relief, like
the CCDs, more broadly available to contracting parties in these kinds
of catastrophic circumstances?
Conventional wisdom and the CCD literature spanning 70 years assume that the CCDs are very limited remedies at best. Practically
speaking, this means that contract law does not provide relief to most
people who want to get out of their contracts because of changed cir30. Id.
31. Brown, supra note 20. For 2021 estimates, see Tracking the COVID-19 Recession’s Effects, supra note 24.
32. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 9001).
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cumstances.33 In a nutshell, this is because the CCDs have front-end
and back-end problems: literally, contract formation and remedy. On
the front end, the CCDs usually fail because they are premised on
assumptions about contracting (i.e., about the parties and the contract-formation process) that simply do not hold up in the real world
today, if they ever did. More specifically, the literature and cases
seemingly agree that the one thing a future adversely affected party
can do to ensure that a CCD will work is to include a provision in the
contract, like a force majeure clause, to protect itself against future
performance-related contingencies.34 Of course, this solution presupposes at a minimum that future adversely affected parties are either
(1) drafting the contracts they are entering into either alone or with
their contracting partners and/or (2) have the wherewithal—knowledge, time, access to information and advice, money, the list goes
on—to not only insist on the inclusion of such a clause in those contracts but also ensure that the clause actually ends up in the written
documents. One or both of these presuppositions does not exist in the
vast majority of consumer or employment contracts, most if not all
online contracts (i.e., like buying music from the Apple store or products from Amazon), or even in a lot of business contracts, particularly
those involving small businesses.35 Consequently, the absence of an
explicit risk-allocation clause in most contracts should surprise no one.
Yet its absence can be and is used to both indict the party who supposedly could have but nevertheless failed to protect itself and predetermine the outcome of the dispute.
The back-end problem that the CCDs present is that the usual remedy for the CCDs is to excuse the promisor from any further performance obligation.36 Excuse, in other words, is either granted or denied.
The remedy is, therefore, presented as a zero-sum game in which one
33. See, e.g., Arthur Anderson, Frustration of Contract—A Rejected Doctrine, 3
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 22 (1953); Michael G. Rapsomanikis, Frustration of Contract in
International Trade Law and Comparative Law, 18 DUQUESNE L. REV. 551, 558–59
(1980); Steven W. Hubbard, Comment, Relief from Burdensome Long-Term Contracts: Commercial Impracticability, Frustration of Purpose, Mutual Mistake of Fact,
and Equitable Adjustment, 47 MO. L. REV. 79, 80 (1982); Leon E. Trakman, Winner
Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial Impracticability, 69 MINN. L. REV. 471, 477
(1985); Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract
Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1 (1991); Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Frustration of Contractual Purpose—Doctrine or Myth?, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 239, 242 (1996); Thomas
Roberts, Commercial Impossibility and Frustration of Purpose: A Critical Analysis, 16
CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 129, 129 (2003); Willem H. Van Boom, Impossibility, Impracticability and Unforeseen Circumstances 9 (Mar. 25, 2020) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561025).
34. See infra discussion accompanying notes 196–200.
35. See infra notes 200–08 and accompanying discussion.
36. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. L. INST. 1981)
(explaining that the “duty to render . . . performance is discharged” if the elements of
impracticability are met).
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party is usually allocated all of the risk and accompanying losses.37 Not
surprisingly, in situations where only one party drafted the contract,
the non-drafting party is saddled with all of the risk and loss because
the non-drafting party failed to include a provision protecting itself in
the contract. The reasoning thus becomes not only circular but selffulfilling.
While this Article grapples with the CCDs, it diverges from the rest
of the CCD literature in several important ways. To begin with, instead of relying on conventional wisdom or anecdotal evidence about
whether the CCDs are “successful”38 when raised in practice, this Article is premised on an empirical study. The study reviewed case law
from all federal and state courts in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.
The findings, detailed below, offer a unique insight. They document
that parties are not generally successful when they raise the CCDs.
That is, courts do not provide any legal relief to the party trying to get
out of the contract because of the changed circumstances in 86% of
the cases in the Seventh Circuit and in 78% of the cases in the Ninth
Circuit.39 So unfortunately, if the past is indeed a prologue for the
future, then the future looks rather bleak. This is because contract law
will most likely let the risk and loss engendered by the COVID–19
pandemic lie where it falls and leave the contracting parties exactly
where it finds them: namely, in breach of their supply contracts, commercial or residential rental agreements, credit card contracts, etc.
Make no mistake: How contract law addresses these ostensibly private contracts will have profound social consequences. How many
people will be evicted from their apartments or lose their homes to
foreclosure? How many of those displaced people will be able to find
new places to live or will remain homeless? How many small businesses will be forced to shut down, never to reopen? How many employees will lose their jobs and remain permanently out of the
workforce? How many people will lose their health insurance either
through lost work or because they simply can no longer afford to pay
for their own private insurance? And what will this increase in the
number of medically uninsured do to the long-term health of all these
affected people and to the already existing health care disparities and
exorbitant healthcare costs in general? How many childcare centers
will close permanently, and what will happen to the employment pros37. See, e.g., Rapsomanikis, supra note 33, at 557; Trakman, supra note 33, at
482–83; see also infra Table 3 and accompanying discussion.
38. The only reason a contracting party would raise one of the CCDs in arbitration
or litigation would be to excuse that party from having to perform the contract. With
this understanding of the CCDs’ purpose, a CCD would only be “successful” when a
court finds that the party’s performance is excused. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“Where . . . a party’s performance is made
impracticable . . . his duty to render that performance is discharged . . . .”).
39. See infra Table 3 and accompanying discussion.
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pects for many of those parents, particularly women,40 who need childcare to work?41
Obviously, contracts and contract law are not the only explanation
for the existential crises confronting so many Americans and American businesses. In other words, it is not just because so many people
and businesses will end up in breach of their contracts that they find
themselves in uncertain and even dire circumstances. But because all
these breaches of contracts will produce profound social consequences, contracts and contract law are, in fact, an integral part of the
systemic problems currently confronting us all. Consequently, and
contrary to all the CCD literature that addresses this issue,42 this Article makes the unconventional argument that the CCDs should be
more broadly available, meaning they should be more successful in
excusing contract performance when triggered by catastrophic
circumstances.
This Article therefore proposes a novel intervention. Unlike the
rest of the field, which focuses on the CCDs themselves,43 this Article
argues that to effectively address the allocation of unforeseen risks in
general, and catastrophic risks like a pandemic in particular, we must
reframe the legal approach to contract formation. This is because formation is the core of the entire contract law system;44 it is literally
where power in a contract is not just embedded but also entrenched.
So, if contract formation is reframed to more accurately reflect contracting in the real world, and given that the solution to the changed
circumstances problem preferred by courts and commentators remains an explicit risk-allocation term in the parties’ contract, then the
solution proposed in this Article to the risk-allocation problem liter40. According to the Washington Post, the shuttering of childcare centers may set
women’s employment back an entire generation. See Alicia Sasser Modestino,
Coronavirus Child-Care Crisis Will Set Women Back a Generation, WASH. POST (July
29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/07/29/childcare-remotelearning-women-employment/ [https://perma.cc/VZC2-YC8A].
41. Reporting shows that 25% of the 950 preschools and in-home sites surveyed
by the Center for the Study of Child Care Employment were closed and that others
that remained open were going into debt to keep their doors open. Edward
Lempinen, California Child Care System Collapsing Under COVID-19, Berkeley Report Says, BERKELEY NEWS (July 22, 2020), https://news.berkeley.edu/2020/07/22/california-child-care-system-collapsing-under-covid-19-berkeley-report-says/ [https://
perma.cc/ZW33-PEZG].
42. See infra discussion accompanying notes 190–95.
43. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 33, at 104–05 (urging equitable price adjustment
as the solution); Trakman, supra note 33, at 481–82, 484–85 (arguing that loss sharing
would minimize many of the issues currently plaguing CCDs in theory and in application); Kull, supra note 33, at 6 (articulating the windfall principle, which argues that
since the parties have not allocated the risk between them, the losses should be left to
lie where they fall).
44. See generally Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of
Power, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275 (2009) [hereinafter Hart, Formation] (arguing that
the power of contracts comes from their formation, particularly the element of mutual
assent); see also infra Part IV.
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ally suggests itself: A risk-allocation clause should be included in most
contracts as part of contract formation. More bluntly, the specific solution will depend on the type of contract involved: (1) For co-drafted
contracts, it would require the inclusion of a standard, negotiable, and
variable risk-and-loss-allocation clause and a good-faith-negotiation
provision; and (2) for most adhesion contracts, it would require the
inclusion of a standard, nonnegotiable, and non-variable risk-and-loss
allocation clause and a good faith negotiation provision. Another important and innovative contribution of this paper, therefore, is that
this Article explicitly recognizes two types of contracts—co-drafted
and adhesive—and proposes a specific solution based on the type of
contract at issue.
In particular, including a risk-and-loss-allocation clause would facilitate transactions and encourage contracting in general by ensuring
that contracts remain efficient and predictable. The risk-and-loss-allocation clause would let contracting parties know in advance how risks
and losses would be allocated between them if a catastrophic changed
circumstance occurs in the future, thereby increasing trust between
the parties and enabling the parties to plan their present and future
affairs accordingly. This is because the risk-and-loss-allocation clause
would require courts and other dispute resolution decision-makers to
shift all the risk and all the loss onto the drafting party in contracts
where only one party actually drafted the contract or onto the party
designated in a co-drafted contract scenario. Because risk and loss
would be explicitly and intentionally allocated in the contract, the
CCDs should arguably not even be necessary. The contract itself
would predetermine the outcome. That said, should the contracting
party that is unhappy with the contract’s risk-and-loss-allocations pursue a contract claim in court (or through arbitration), the existence of
a risk-and-loss-allocation clause would predetermine the outcome of
the CCD cases just as the absence of a risk-and-loss-allocation clause
does now. In such cases, the CCDs would and should be more broadly
available to excuse performance under a contract.
The main difference between the risk-and-loss-allocation clause
proposed here and existing contract law, of course, is who bears all the
risk and loss occasioned by the catastrophic changed circumstance. So
to be clear, if nothing changes and our approach to contract formation
remains the same as it is right now, then all the risk and all the attendant loss will generally be left to lie where it falls, namely, on the party
trying to get out of the contract because of the changed circumstances.
This will be result regardless of the legal theory used to justify (or
demonize) the CCDs or any changes made to the doctrines
themselves.
One of this Article’s most important contributions, therefore, is to
expose the social consequences created when the effects of ostensibly
private contracts between private parties, particularly adhesion con-
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tracts (i.e., where only one party drafts the document), are aggregated.
Of course, even if the solution suggested in this Article gets adopted,
it will come too late to help any of the people and businesses affected
by the COVID–19 pandemic. The risk-and-loss-allocation clause and
good-faith-negotiation provision being proposed here simply do not
exist in any of these affected contracts. For this reason, this Article
also proposes a principled way for judges or arbitrators deciding CCD
cases going forward, particularly cases involving adhesion contracts, to
find that the risk and loss created by a catastrophic changed circumstance should fall on the drafting party.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that any relief provided to a
contracting party under the CCDs via any of the solutions proposed in
this Article would be meted out contract by contract. Because of this
case-by-case approach, contract law is not and never will be a systemic
fix for systemic failures in American society. Systemic relief must
come from the State. That said, the United States is at a critical moment in its history right now, and as a result, contract law is or will be
forced to confront a critical moment in its evolution. If we finally acknowledge the public aspects of contracts and contract law—namely,
that they do in fact produce social consequences that extend beyond
the individual contract and contracting parties—then contracts and
contract law may well be part of the solutions to some of the most
pressing problems confronting American society now and into the
future.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II begins with a primer on the
CCDs and then lays out the methodology, findings, and analysis of the
empirical study conducted for the Article. The primary conclusion
from the study is that the CCDs are not generally successful when
raised in practice, even when the contingency causing the contractual
disruption was the September 11th terrorist attacks, the Great Recession of 2007–2009, or other similarly catastrophic events. Part III then
highlights the distinction between co-drafted contracts and adhesion
contracts and examines in more detail why courts and commentators
are so reluctant to let people out of their contracts under the CCDs.
The focus on contract formation as the source of the problem distinguishes this Article from the rest of the CCD literature and introduces
some Legal Realism into both the discussion and the explanation. Finally, Part IV discusses the solutions proposed by this Article in detail,
specifically how the risk-and-loss-allocation clause and the good-faithnegotiation provision would work in both a co-drafted contract and an
adhesive contract scenario.
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY

OF THE

PROBLEM

Before discussing the data, a primer on the CCDs is needed. The
CCDs typically include impossibility of performance, impracticability
of performance (a.k.a. commercial impracticability), and frustration of
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purpose (a.k.a. commercial frustration).45 All the CCDs are triggered
by changed circumstances, that is, when circumstances change so dramatically after contract formation such that performance is (1) literally
impossible, (2) impracticable because of excessive and unreasonable
cost, or (3) almost completely valueless to one party.46 While CCDs
have changed circumstances in common, they differ from each other
in specific ways, including how they address different performancerelated problems and receive separate analytical treatment.47
The doctrine of impossibility requires objective impossibility. In
other words, the party seeking to get out of the contract must prove
that the performance promised in the contract is physically not possible, that is, that no one could perform.48 The Taylor v. Caldwell case is
the oft-cited example.49
In Taylor, the parties contracted for Taylor to use Caldwell’s music
hall for a series of performances that would occur over four days.50
Unfortunately, an accidental fire destroyed Caldwell’s music hall
before the first performance was scheduled to take place.51 The destruction of the music hall made Caldwell’s duty to provide that music
hall objectively impossible.52 Taylor then sued Caldwell for breach of
contract.53 The Court held that Caldwell’s duty to provide the music
hall under the parties’ contract was excused because it found that the
parties contracted on the basis of the continued existence of the music
hall.54
Contract law theoretically shifted from impossibility to impracticability of performance sometime in the 1900s.55 Or perhaps it is more
accurate to say that contract law acknowledged something it already
recognized: Literal impossibility was not required to excuse performance.56 Instead, the party seeking relief from a contract could now
45. See Rapsomanikis, supra note 33, at 551.
46. See id.
47. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUDS. 83, 85 (1977).
48. See id.; Uri Benoliel, The Impossibility Doctrine in Commercial Contracts: An
Empirical Analysis, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 393, 395–96 (2020).
49. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.5 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing Taylor v.
Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (QB), and calling it “the fountainhead of the
modern law of impossibility”).
50. Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 312.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 310.
54. Id. at 314–15.
55. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 33, at 84; Liu Chengwei, Remedies for Nonperformance: Perspectives from CISG, UNIDROIT Principles & PECL § 19.3.1
(2003) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://www.academia.edu/37883872/
Remedies_for_Non_performance_Perspectives_from_CISG_UNIDROIT_Principles_
and_PECL).
56. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 49, § 9.6 (“[C]ourts did not insist on strict
impossibility even under the traditional analysis.”). But see JEFF FERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 572 (3rd ed. 2014).
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show that the performance had become “impracticable,” meaning that
it could be done only with extreme and unanticipated difficulty or
cost.57 With impracticability of performance, therefore, the performance is not literally impossible, it has just become too difficult or costly
to perform.58 The modern doctrine of impracticability of performance
originated in the Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard case.59
In Mineral Park, a contractor agreed to remove all the gravel from
the owner’s land that the contractor required for a construction project and purchase it at a fixed price.60 The contractor ended up taking
only some of the gravel needed for the construction project from the
owner’s land because, as the parties discovered after extraction began,
much of the gravel on the owner’s land was submerged underwater.61
The contractor therefore argued that its performance should be excused because removing the gravel that was submerged required a different method of extraction and would cost 10 to 12 times more to
remove.62 The California Supreme Court agreed that the extreme increase in cost justified the contractor’s nonperformance. According to
the court, “[a] thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not
practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at
an excessive and unreasonable cost.”63
Finally, the frustration of purpose doctrine generally deals with
changed circumstances that make the contract almost completely
worthless to one of the parties.64 So like impracticability of performance, performance of the contract is not literally impossible. Rather,
performance is still possible. But frustration of purpose differs from
impracticability of performance because the adversely affected party
must be able to show that its principal purpose in entering into the
contract has been frustrated.65 More importantly, that purpose is frustrated only where the object is “so completely the basis of the contract
that, as both parties know, without it the contract would have little
meaning.”66 In other words, frustration of purpose requires that both
parties have some kind of common understanding about the principal
purpose of the contract. The Krell v. Henry67 case is the usual
example.
57. See Hubbard, supra note 33, at 84; Liu, supra note 55, § 19.3.1.
58. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 47, at 86; Benoliel, supra note 48, at 397.
59. FERRIELL, supra note 56, at 572 (discussing Min. Park Land Co. v. Howard,
156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916)).
60. Min. Park, 156 P. at 458.
61. Id. at 458–59.
62. Id. at 459.
63. Id. at 460.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 265 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981); Hubbard, supra note 33, at 83, 93; Anderson, supra note 33, at 4; Weiskopf, supra note 33,
at 239–40.
65. Weiskopf, supra note 33, at 240.
66. Id. at 248 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 265 cmt. a).
67. Krell v. Henry [1903], 2 KB 740.
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In Krell, the defendant rented a room from the plaintiff that overlooked the route of the coronation procession for King Edward VII.68
The plaintiff was aware that the defendant’s primary purpose for renting the room was to view the coronation procession because the plaintiff had advertised his room specifically for this purpose.69 When the
procession did not take place as originally scheduled, the defendant
no longer had any need of the room and refused to pay the balance
due under the contract.70 The court held that the coronation procession was “the foundation of the contract” and was recognized as such
by both parties.71 As a result, and even though the defendant’s promise to pay was obviously still performable, the court held that the cancellation of the coronation procession excused the defendant from his
duty to pay.72
As the foregoing discussion shows, the CCDs have been around for
a long time.73 Consequently, considerable conventional wisdom has
developed about them. Some of that wisdom includes the following:
(1) impossibility and impracticability of performance are generally
raised by the contracting party with performance obligations, like
building the house, delivering the goods, etc., as opposed to the paying
party;74 (2) contract law shifted away from impossibility to impracticability;75 (3) frustration of purpose is generally raised by the paying
party;76 (4) courts are much more reluctant to excuse performance
based on frustration of purpose;77 and (5) the changed circumstance
(i.e., the event) that triggers the CCDs (a) will usually involve “acts of
God” or acts by third parties78 and (b) cannot be in the control of the
68. Id. at 740.
69. Id. at 750.
70. Id. at 740.
71. Id. at 754.
72. Id.
73. The dates associated with the aforementioned decisions are illustrative. Taylor
v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (QB) (impossibility); Min. Park Land Co. v.
Howard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916) (impracticability); Krell, 2 KB at 740 (frustration of
purpose); see also Rapsomanikis, supra note 33, at 551.
74. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 49, § 9.7.
75. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, for example, only discusses changed
circumstances in terms of impracticability, not impossibility. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTS. §§ 261–64 (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also, FERRIELL, supra note
56, at 569 (“Contract law originally limited this escape to situations in which the
change of circumstances had made performance literally impossible . . . . The law later
expanded to provide relief where performance had not become completely impossible, but where . . . the burden of performing had changed in a way that was beyond
the risks assumed by the parties when the contract was made[, i.e.,] performance . . .
ha[d] become ‘commercially impracticable.’ ”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 49, § 9.6 (referring to impracticability as the new synthesis of the law of impossibility).
76. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 49, § 9.7.
77. See id.; Weiskopf, supra note 33, at 267; Van Boom, supra note 33, at 9.
78. For example, all the illustrations used in Restatement (Second) of Conts.
§§ 261 and 265 involve acts of God or acts by third parties. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTS. § 261 cmt d. (“Events that come within the rule stated in this
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party seeking to excuse its performance.79 But if the changed circumstance preventing the party seeking to be excused from performing
was caused by the other party, then this should ordinarily be treated
as a breach of contract by the other party.80 This last piece of conventional wisdom therefore suggests that if the other party’s actions that
caused the changed circumstances was not a breach by that party, then
the party seeking to be excused should be able to argue one of the
CCDs to justify its non-performance. It just remains to be seen
whether the conventional wisdom about the CCDs holds true in
practice.
A. The Cases
Once in a contract, it is very difficult to get out.81 This generally
accepted proposition has been substantiated with more and more empirical work,82 most notably with respect to the doctrine of unconscionability.83 But not a lot of empirical work exists that examines the
CCDs. Notably, only a couple of such studies examine the CCDs
under U.S. law.84 Thus, by focusing on the CCDs, this Subsection adds
to the growing body of empirical scholarship, confirming that courts
rarely let parties out of a contract once that contract has been formed.
Section [impracticability] are generally due either to “acts of God” or to act of third
parties.”)
79. With respect to the changed circumstance outside the control of the party
seeking to be excused, see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conts. § 261 (“Where, after
a contract is made, a party’s performance is made impracticable without his fault
. . . .”); id. § 265 (“Where, after a contract is made, a party’s principal purpose is
substantially frustrated without his fault . . . .”).
80. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 261 cmt d. (“If the event that
prevents the obligor’s performance is caused by the obligee, it will ordinarily amount
to a breach by the latter . . . without regard to this Section.”).
81. See generally, Danielle Kie Hart, In & Out—Contract Doctrines in Action, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 1661 (2015) [hereinafter, Hart, In & Out]; see also Robert M. Lloyd,
Making Contracts Relevant: Thirteen Lessons for the First-Year Contracts Course, 36
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 267 (2004); Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. and Contract Theory: An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 110
(1998); Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 99, 99 (1990) (“Notwithstanding academic writing that reports or urges expansion of the grounds of excuse, courts actually remain extremely reluctant to release
parties from their obligations.”).
82. See, e.g., Hart, In & Out, supra note 81 (evaluating duress, modification, and
impracticability of performance empirically through various cases); Grace M. Giesel,
A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 443,
463–65 (2005) (exploring courts’ treatment of duress in contract disputes).
83. See Brian M. McCall, Demystifying Unconscionability: A Historical and Empirical Analysis, 65 VILL. L. REV. 773 (2020) (performing an empirical study of unconscionability and summarizing other existing empirical studies covering the same
doctrine).
84. See Benoliel, supra note 48; Anderson, supra note 33. There are, however,
empirical studies that examine CCDs in other countries. See, e.g., Smaran Shetty &
Pranav Budihal, Force Majeure, Frustration and Impossibility: A Qualitative Empirical
Analysis (Aug. 6, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3665213 [https://perma.cc/47AMMU9J] (Indian law).
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I first describe the methodology used to collect the cases for the Article. Then, I present the results of the data collected and draw some
conclusions based on that data. To conclude the Subsection, I make
some observations based on the data, including, but not limited to,
some comments about the conventional wisdom discussed in the CCD
primer above.
1. Methodology
The case law empirical study conducted here focused on three common law doctrines: impossibility of performance, supervening impracticability of performance, and supervening frustration of purpose.
Excluded were existing and temporary impracticability or frustration.
This study updates earlier impracticability of performance research I
conducted in 201585 by adding five and a half years of additional data
(2014–2019). The study is entirely new with respect to impossibility
and frustration of purpose. All told, the study includes 20 years of
data for impossibility and impracticability of performance
(2000–2019)86 and ten years of data for frustration of purpose
(2005–2015). This ten-year window for frustration of purpose was specifically selected to capture the jurisprudential outcomes surrounding
the Great Recession (2007–2009). A total of 136 cases from the federal and state courts within the Seventh and Ninth Circuits were collected for the study.87 The research was conducted in the following
steps:
I. Selecting the Jurisdictions. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits
were selected, because these circuits were the ones used in my
2015 empirical study.88 That said, the reasons these circuits were
selected for the previous study make sense here as well. More
specifically, the Ninth Circuit was selected because, with nine
states,89 it is the largest of all thirteen circuits and is likely to
hear a lot of cases. The Ninth Circuit also has a reputation of
85. Hart, In & Out, supra note 81.
86. Even though impossibility is entirely new in this empirical study, I used the
same time period for impossibility that I used for impracticability of performance
(2000–2019). This is because impossibility and impracticability of performance are
similar enough doctrines that using a different time frame would seemingly skew the
data.
87. The cases collected here are from a dataset of cases consisting of court opinions made available on LexisNexis. Consequently, the following are omitted from the
available LexisNexis dataset: (1) all cases where the parties voluntarily agreed to cancel the contract (either because no lawsuit was ever brought or the case was settled
before a decision) and (2) an unknowable number of cases litigated in state court that
were not appealed since very few state trial court decisions result in an opinion.
88. Hart, In & Out, supra note 81.
89. The states within the Ninth Circuit are Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. What Is the Ninth Circuit?, https:/
/www.ca9.uscourts.gov/judicial-council/what-is-the-ninth-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/
CFF9-9U3U].
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being more consumer friendly, suggesting that courts there
might be more inclined to excuse people from their contractual
obligations than courts in other circuits. The Seventh Circuit, in
contrast, is much smaller, encompassing only three states,90 but
it is closely associated with the Law and Economics approach
and therefore has a reputation for being less consumer friendly,
suggesting that courts there might be more likely to require that
people fulfill their contractual promises.91
II. The Searches. Each search was conducted on LexisNexis for
Law School. The searches were broken down by doctrine, applying the timelines, jurisdictional filters, and search terms
specified below:
a. Jurisdictional Filters—All Searches
i. Seventh Circuit—Jurisdiction: Seventh Circuit, Illinois,
Indiana Wisconsin
ii. Ninth Circuit—Jurisdiction: Ninth Circuit, Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon, Washington
* All the federal and state courts in the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits are included in the jurisdictional filters.
b. Impracticability of Performance: Original Search (from
2015 Study)
i. Timeline: January 1, 2000, through March 1, 2014
ii. Search Terms
1. Impracticability of Performance: (impract! near/25
perform!) and (perform! near /25 contract).
c. Impracticability of Performance: Updated Search (2020)
i. Timeline: March 15, 2014, through December 31, 2019
ii. Search Terms
1. impract! near/25 perform!
2. perform! near /25 contract
3. (impract! near/25 perform!) and (perform! near /25
contract)
4. “impracticability of performance”
5. “Restatement (Second) of Contracts §261”
d. Impossibility of Performance
i. Timeline: January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2019
ii. Search Terms
1. “Impossibility of Performance”
e. Frustration of Purpose
i. Timeline: January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2015
90. The states within the Seventh Circuit are Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.
About the Court, https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/about-court/about-court.htm [https://
perma.cc/XHK8-Z56V].
91. See Hart, In & Out, supra note 81, at 1668.
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ii. Search Terms
1. “Frustration of purpose”
2. “Restatement (Second) of Contracts §265”
III. Screening the Cases. The searches conducted for this study
pulled up 176 cases for the Seventh Circuit and 502 cases for
the Ninth Circuit.92 Each case was initially screened to ensure
that it addressed the relevant doctrine being examined and
that some part of the case was decided based on that doctrine.
Only cases that satisfied these criteria were selected for substantive review.
IV. Substantive Review of the Cases. Each of the selected cases
was then read to ensure, first, that it fell within the jurisdiction
of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits and, second, that it did in
fact address and decide the contract law doctrine at issue.
Cases were omitted, for example, when the court deciding it
applied law from a state outside of the two circuits that were
the subject of this study (i.e., an Illinois court applying New
Jersey law).93 On occasion, substantive review revealed that
the case decided an issue involving more than one doctrine,
for example, both impossibility and frustration of purpose. In
this situation, the case was selected for both doctrines. It also
happened occasionally that a case being reviewed for one doctrine, for example frustration of purpose, actually focused
more on another doctrine, like impracticability of performance. In these situations, the case was included as a selected
case for the other doctrine even though the case did not appear in the search conducted for that doctrine.
V. Totals. At the end of the substantive review process, a total of
136 cases were captured—37 cases for the Seventh Circuit and
99 cases for the Ninth Circuit. Table 1 provides a summary of
the captured cases in each circuit by substantive category and
doctrine.

92. The original empirical study I published in 2015 did not separate the number
of cases by doctrine. The study only included the total number of cases found for all
doctrines examined in the earlier project, so the numbers stated in this text only reflect the cases discovered in the searches conducted for this empirical study.
93. See, e.g., Days Inn of Am., Inc. v. Patel, 88 F. Supp. 2d 928 (C.D. Ill. 2000)
(applying New Jersey law).
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY

OF

CAPTURED CASES
CATEGORY94

7th Cir:
Performance
Real Property
7
Employment
3
Goods
4
Misc. Commercial
3
Settlement Agreements 2
Misc. Services
3
Family
0
Insurance
1
Public Util./Energy
1
Construction
1
Education
0
Leases
2
Software
0
Claim Category

Seq: 19

7th Cir:
FoP
1
2
3
1
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

BY

14:15

365
SUBSTANTIVE

9th Cir:
Performance
31
5
3
4
4
5
4
2
1
3
2
0
1

9th Cir:
FoP
20
3
2
2
1
0
2
2
2
0
0
0
0

Total
59
13
12
10
9
8
6
6
4
4
2
2
1

The vast majority of the contracts in the captured cases appear to be
commercial (as opposed to consumer) contracts between commercial
parties.95 I say, “appear to be,” because none of the cases actually
included a copy of the contracts involved in the disputes or provide
many details about the parties. So determining what kind of contracts
were involved in each case is based on who the contracting parties are
(i.e., individuals, government entities, or businesses) and the subject
matter of the contract (i.e., construction, business, etc.). Based on
these loose parameters, only 38 non-business transactions exist out of
the 136 cases collected for the empirical study.96 Out of those 38 cases,
94. See Appendix 1 for a list of all captured cases by circuit and doctrine (the
performance doctrine, which combines impossibility and impracticability, and the
doctrine of frustration of purpose (“FoP”)) (on file with Author). Settlement
agreements included commercial settlements, indemnity agreements, and consent
decrees. The “Family” category includes all family-related settlement agreements.
95. A “commercial contract” is defined broadly here as one that involves any kind
of business and/or is economic in nature. Hence, a “commercial party” is a party (individual or business entity) that enters the contract for profit or economic reasons, as
opposed to a “consumer,” which is specifically defined by the U.C.C. as “an individual
who enters a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”
U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(11) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020) (consumer).
96. The cases involving non-business transactions, grouped by type, are as follows:
RESIDENTIAL REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS (17):
Prospect Enters. v. Ruff, No. 10-1026, 2011 WL 2683004, at *2–3 (C.D. Ill. July 11,
2011) (sale of townhome); Exec. Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Watson, No. 1-10-1890, 2011 WL
10069467, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 29, 2011) (residential lease); Ury v. Di Bari, No. 1-
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15-0277, 2016 WL 2610167, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. May 5, 2016) (sale of condo); Samuels
v. Merrill, No. B190158, 2007 WL 2084093, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 23, 2007) (sale of
condo); Miranda v. Williams, No. F054365, 2008 WL 4636445, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 21, 2008) (purchase and construction of residential property); Archundia v.
Chase Home Fin. LLC, No. 09-CV-00960 (AJB), 2009 WL 1796295, at *1 (S.D. Cal.
June 23, 2009) (residential property foreclosure); Bean v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 11-CV-553, 2012 WL 10349, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2012) (residential
property foreclosure); Reader v. BAC Home Loan Servicing LP, No. 11-CV-553, 2012
WL 125977, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 17, 2012) (residential property foreclosure); Gutierrez
v. PNC Mortg., No. 10CV01770, 2012 WL 1033063, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012)
(home loan refinance and modification); Wear v. Sierra Pac. Mortg. Co., No. C13-535,
2013 WL 6008498, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 2013) (residential home mortgage foreclosure); Deschaine v. IndyMac Mortg. Servs., No. CIV. 2:13-1991, 2013 WL 6054456,
at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2013) (residential home mortgage); Lane v. Cooper, No.
D062806, 2014 WL 606556, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2014) (condo CC & Rs); Bob
Spain Real Est. Servs., Inc. v. Cox, No. 32006-5, 2015 WL 422371, at *1 (Jan. 27, 2015)
(real estate listing agreement); Tanner v. Keating, No. F071491, 2017 WL 2376393, at
*1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 1, 2017) (purchase of residence); Balboa Bay Club, Inc. v.
Howard, No. G033413, 2005 WL 827064, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2005) (residential lease); Goldberg v. Prickett, No. B203934, 2009 WL 179572, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 27, 2009) (sale of residential leasehold); Lohman v. Ephraim, No. B207755, 2010
WL 6901, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2009) (sale of residential property).
EMPLOYMENT-RELATED TRANSACTIONS (8):
Dalkilic v. Titan Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1181 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Caravette v. Z
Trim Holdings, Inc., No. 2-11-0087, 2011 WL 10457470, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 29,
2011); Downs v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC, 963 N.E.2d 282, 286, 288 (Ill. App. Ct.
2011); Ryan v. Estate of Sheppard (In re Estate of Sheppard), 789 N.W.2d 616, 617
(Wis. Ct. App. 2010); Dauod v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., No. SACV 10-00302, 2010 WL
11595801, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2010); LECG, LLC v. Unni, No. C-13-0639, 2014
WL 2186734, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2014); Kische USA LLC v. Simsek, No. C160168, 2017 WL 3895545, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2017); Mitchell v. Leed HR,
LLC, No. 2:14-CV-00026, 2015 WL 1611447, at *1–2 (D. Idaho Apr. 10, 2015).
FAMILY-RELATED TRANSACTIONS (5):
Archer v. Archer (In re Marriage of Archer), No. 1 CA-CV 08-0543, 2009 WL
1682146, at ¶ 2 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 16, 2009) (marriage settlement agreement); In re
Marriage of Weber, No. 64739-3, 2011 WL 1947728, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. May 23,
2011) (marital asset agreement); Hibbard v. Hibbard (In re Marriage of Hibbard), 151
Cal. Rptr. 3d 553, 554 (Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2013); Bennett v. Foss, No. A137452, 2014
WL 1679559, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2014) (settlement memo); Klein v. Klein,
No. B213125, 2009 WL 3807442, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2009) (marital settlement agreement).
MISCELLANEOUS TRANSACTIONS (8):
Tahir v. Imp. Acquisition Motors, LLC, No. 09 C 6471, 2014 WL 985351, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 13, 2014) (sale of a car); Ploegman v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., Co., No.
46776, 2002 WL 1161387, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. June 3, 2002) (personal injury indemnity agreement); Carsh v. Chaparral Pines, LLC, No. 2 CA-CV 2002-0175, 2003 Ariz.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 59, at *2–3 (Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2003) (contract involving a golf
membership); Kashmiri v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 635, 638–39
(Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2007) (contract regarding cost of education); Babcock v. ING Life
Ins. & Annuity Co., No. 12-CV-5093, 2013 WL 24372, at *1–2 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 2,
2013) (insurance structured settlement); Achziger v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins., No. C14-
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only 15 of them appear to involve adhesive contracts,97 i.e., contracts
drafted by one party, usually but not always on a standard form, and
presented to the other party on a take it or leave it basis.98 Four commercial contracts could also be characterized as adhesive.99
To be clear: I do not claim that the empirical study conducted for
this Article captured all the CCD cases in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. For example, this study focused exclusively on the common law
CCDs and not the sale of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code
(i.e., § 2-615). Nor does this study make any claim to have captured all
the CCD cases that applied law from the Seventh or Ninth Circuits. In
other words, the study only focused on cases generated from states
within each of the circuits selected; the study, therefore, would not
have captured a New York court applying California law. That said,
5445, 2017 WL 5194914, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2017) (insurance settlement);
Koka v. Koka, No. B277116, 2017 WL 5898391, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2017)
(real property settlement agreement); Hensley for Hensley v. Haney-Turner, LLC,
No. Civ. S-01-2212, 2006 WL 8458651, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2006) (ADA
settlement).
97. The cases involving non-business transactions with adhesive contracts,
grouped by type, are as follows:
RESIDENTIAL REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS (10):
Prospect Enters., 2011 WL 2683004, at *1–2 (sale of townhome); Watson, 2011 WL
10069467 at *1–2 (residential lease); Archundia, 2009 WL 1796295, at *1 (residential
property foreclosure); Bean, 2012 WL 10349, at *1 (residential property foreclosure);
Reader, 2012 WL 125977, at *1 (residential property foreclosure); Gutierrez, 2012 WL
1033063, at *1 (home loan refinance and modification); Wear, 2013 WL 6008498, at *1
(residential home mortgage foreclosure); Deschaine, 2013 WL 6054456, at *1–2 (residential home mortgage); Bob Spain Real Est. Servs., 2015 WL 422371, at *1 (real
estate listing agreement); Balboa, 20115 WL 827064, at *1 (residential lease).
EMPLOYMENT-RELATED TRANSACTIONS (2):
Dalkilic, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 1180–81 (Turkish interpreters during Iraq War); Dauod,
2010 WL 11595801, at *1 (forgivable loans repayable immediate if employee left
before 7 years).
MISCELLANEOUS TRANSACTIONS (3):
Carsh, 2003 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 59, at *1 (contract involving a golf membership); Babcock, 2013 WL 24372, at *1–2 (insurance structured settlement); Achziger,
2017 WL 5194914, at *1 (insurance settlement).
98. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1173, 1176–77 (1983).
99. See Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc. v. City of S. Bend, No. 71C01-1212-MI-00244,
2013 WL 3812025 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Feb. 20, 2013) (commercial lease); Butterfield Plaza
Benson, LLC v. Johnson, No. 2 CA-CV 2010-0042, 2010 WL 4705181, at *1 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Nov. 19, 2010) (commercial lease); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ash Org., No. 09CV-188, 2010 WL 2681675, at *1 (D. Or. July 2, 2010) (commercial loan foreclosure—
land under mobile home park); United States v. Sandwich Isles Commc’ns, Inc., 398
F. Supp. 3d 757, 764–65 (D. Haw. 2019) (telecommunication loan agreements with the
federal government).
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and with respect to the common law CCDs, the study collected a significant number of CCD cases spanning 20 years. Collectively, therefore, the cases create a clear picture of how the CCDs are being
interpreted and applied in practice and a solid basis upon which to
draw some conclusions.
2. The Data and Conclusions
This empirical study captured a total of 18 cases that cited a catastrophic changed circumstance as the event excusing performance: 3
in the Seventh Circuit and 15 in the Ninth Circuit. Parties raised the
Great Recession in 14 of the cases, the September 11th terrorist attack
in one case, and the unprecedented manipulation of California’s energy market, the collapse of the wine-grape market, and the Californian fiscal crisis in three cases.100 As Table 2 shows, even a
catastrophic changed circumstance is generally insufficient to excuse
the party adversely affected by that event from having to perform a
contract. In fact, performance was excused in only one out of the 18
cases (6%), meaning, of course, that performance was not excused in
17 of the cases (i.e., 94% of the time).
TABLE 2: CATASTROPHIC CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES101

Great
Recession
9/11
Other
Total

7th Cir: 7th Cir:
7th Cir:
Total Performance Performance
Excused
Not Excused
# of
Cases
3
0
3
0
0
3

0
0
0

0
0
3 (100%)

9th Cir: 9th Cir:
9th Cir:
Total Performance Performance
Excused
Not Excused
# of
Cases
11
0
11
1
3
15

0
1
1 (7 %)

1
2
14 (93%)

Next, Table 3 aggregates the data by doctrine (with the two performance CCDs—impossibility and impracticability—combined). Table 3 confirms that the CCDs are not generally successful in excusing
performance in either the Seventh or the Ninth Circuits. More specifically, courts in the Seventh Circuit excused performance in only 14%
of the cases. Courts in the Ninth Circuit were a little more likely to
excuse performance, namely, in 22% of the cases. Overall, combining
all the data shows that courts did not excuse performance in 80% of
the cases.
100. See Appendix 2 (on file with Author).
101. See Appendix 2 (on file with Author).
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TABLE 3: PERFORMANCE EXCUSED/NOT EXCUSED102
7th Cir: 7th Cir:
7th Cir:
Total Performance Performance
Excused
Not Excused
# of
Cases
Imprac/
27
4
23
Imposs
FoP
10
1
9
Total
37
5 (14%)
32 (86%)

9th Cir: 9th Cir:
9th Cir:
Total Performance Performance
Excused
Not Excused
# of
Cases
65
16
49
34
99

6
22 (22%)

28
78 (78%)

In reviewing the cases, the CCD claims typically failed for four
main reasons. Each of the four main reasons was cited at least 15
times.103 A summary of the reasons the CCDs failed is provided in
Table 4 below. Table 4 lays out this data by circuit. While it was not
uncommon for a CCD to fail for more than one reason (for example,
the event was both foreseeable and a risk assigned to the adversely
affected party), Table 4 tracks the cases based on each of the categories discussed above. In other words, if a CCD failed because it was
foreseeable and the risk was assigned, the case would be counted in
both the Foreseeable and Risk categories in Table 4. For this reason,
there will be cases that appear in more than one category in Appendix
4, which lists the cases in Table 4.
The first reason the CCDs failed has to do with the type of event
(i.e., the changed circumstance) identified as triggering the CCD
claim. Courts routinely held that a party’s own financial ability to perform its duties under a contract and market conditions are not the
type of event that justifies nonperformance under the CCDs.104 And
to be clear: Finances and market conditions were not the right kinds
of events even if the party alleged that its finances were adversely
affected because of an economic crisis105 like the Great Recession,106
changed market conditions due to the collapse of the wine grape mar102. See Appendix 2 for a list of all cases used for this analysis (on file with
Author). Table 3 shows the total number of cases excused and not excused for each
circuit, separated by the performance doctrines (impracticability (“Imprac”) and
impossibility (“Imposs”)) and the doctrine of frustration of purpose (FoP).
103. See infra Table 4.
104. See, e.g., Prospect Enters. v. Ruff, No. 10-1026, 2011 WL 2683004, at *7 (C.D.
Ill. July 11, 2011); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Shelbourne Dev. Grp., No. 09 C 4963, 2011
WL 829390, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2011); In re Marriage of Weber, No. 64739–3–1,
2011 WL 1947728, at *2–3 (Wash. Ct. App. May 23, 2011); Bean v. BAC Home Loans
Servicing, L.P., No. 11-CV-553, 2012 WL 10349, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2012); Reader
v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P., No. 11-CV-553, 2012 WL 125977, at *4 (D. Ariz.
Jan. 17, 2012).
105. See, e.g., Mañay v. Acad. Exch. of Am., No. C07-5071, 2008 WL 820097, at *5
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2008); Hellerstein v. Desert Lifestyles, LLC, No. 15-CV-01804,
2015 WL 6962862, at *9 (D. Nev. Nov. 10, 2015).
106. See, e.g., Shelbourne Dev. Grp., 2011 WL 829390, at *4–5 (concerning a commercial property developer alleging the inability to obtain construction loan commitments from banks, because the Great Recession caused the developer to default).
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ket,107 or the housing market crash that precipitated the Great
Recession.108
Indeed, courts often found that the event cited by the adversely affected party was foreseeable or at least not unanticipated. Such events
included things like the Great Recession,109 class action litigation
against an insurance company,110 the inability to obtain financing for a
project,111 changing market conditions,112 a third party absconding
with money,113 and changes in state or federal regulation.114 The foreseeability of the event is the second main reason why the CCD claims
failed.115
The CCD claims also failed in the cases because the courts found
that the adversely affected party either contributed to the event’s occurrence or failed to meet the burden of proof that it did not contribute to the happening of the event.116 So for example, courts held that
a CCD failed because the adversely affected party: (1) could not show
that it did not contribute to the circumstances giving rise to the class
action litigations against it;117 (2) shut down one of its reactors as part
of routine maintenance thereby causing the shortage of materials being complained about;118 (3) failed to act with due diligence;119 and (4)
built and opened a store in violation of its agreement with the other
party.120
107. French Camp Vineyards v. Guenoc Winery, No. CPF-04-504511, 2005 Cal.
Super. LEXIS 1673, at *6–8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 2005) (terminating a grape and
wine purchasing agreement between a winery and a vineyard due to the wine grape
market collapse).
108. See, e.g., Realty Execs. Int’l Inc. v. RE/EX Cal. Inc., No. 2:09-CV-00562, 2011
WL 13185715, at *5 (D. Ariz. June 1, 2011) (regarding a regional franchise developer
that failed to pay franchise fees because of housing market crash); Bean, 2012 WL
10349, at *5.
109. See, e.g., Ner Tamid Congregation of N. Town v. Krivoruchko, No. 08 C 1261,
2009 WL 10696538, at *11 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009) (holding that risk of the Great
Recession may have been uncertain but it was not unforeseeable); Archer v. Archer
(In re Marriage of Archer), No. 1 CA-CV-08-0543, 2009 WL 1682146, at *2–3 (Ariz.
Ct. App. June 16, 2009).
110. Blue Cross Blue Shield v. BCS Ins., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1058 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
111. YPI 180 N. LaSalle Owner, LLC v. 180 N. LaSalle II, LLC, 933 N.E.2d 860,
865–66 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Archer, 2009 WL 1682146, at *2–3.
112. French Camp Vineyards, 2005 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1673, at *7.
113. Cashman Equip. Co. v. W. Edna Assocs., 380 P.3d 844, 846–47, 852–53 (Nev.
2016).
114. United States v. Sandwich Isles Commc’ns, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 3d 757, 772 (D.
Haw. 2019); Pure Wafer Inc. v. City of Prescott, 845 F.3d 943, 957 (9th Cir. 2017).
115. See infra Table 4.
116. See infra Table 4.
117. Blue Cross Blue Shield v. BCS Ins., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1058 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
118. BRC Rubber & Plastics, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 949 F. Supp. 2d 862,
876–77 (N.D. Ind. 2013).
119. Nielsen Bros. v. Solid Trading, Ltd., No. 52535-2-I, 2004 WL 2581556, at *4
(Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2004).
120. Cabela’s Retail, Inc. v. Hawks Prairie Inv., LLC, No. 11-cv-5973-RBL, 2013
WL 3089516, at *1, 12 (W.D. Wash. June 18, 2013).
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The CCDs also failed when the courts found that the risk of the
event occurring was assigned to the adversely affected party because
(1) the event represented a type of “normal risk” that is assumed by
the adversely affected party;121 (2) a specific clause in the contract
allocated the risk to the adversely affected party;122 (3) the absence of
a specific clause in the contract meant that the risk was allocated to
the adversely affected party;123 or (4) the adversely affected party
failed to show that it did not bear the risk.124
It was also not uncommon for a single case to cite more than one,
sometimes overlapping or conflated, reason why the CCD failed. For
example, CCDs failed because: the event was a foreseeable business
risk;125 the event was foreseeable such that the risk was assumed by
the adversely affected party;126 or the event was foreseeable and the
adversely affected party contributed to it.127
Finally, there were a host of other reasons why the CCDs failed that
do not fail squarely within any of the categories of reasons just described. Some of those reasons are still worth mentioning here because they were raised in several cases. These other reasons include,
among other things: (1) objective, literal impossibility is required
before performance will be excused;128 (2) the fact that performance
121. Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v. NRG Energy, Inc., No. 03 C 2265, 2004 WL
2095554, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2004); Prospect Enters. V. Ruff, No. 10-1026, 2011
WL 2683004, at *7 (C.D. Ill. July 11, 2011); PeopleSoft U.S.A., Inc. v. Softeck, Inc.,
227 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1118–19 (N.D. Cal. 2002); French Camp Vineyards v. Guenoc
Winery, No. CPF-04-504511, 2005 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1673, at *7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr.
22, 2005).
122. Prime/Mansur Inv. Partners, LLC v. Phx. Off., LLC, No. 1-10-0928, 2011 WL
10069096, at *7 (Ill. App. Ct. June 30, 2011); Rock & Stone Mfg. Inc. v. Allied Stone
Sys., No. 1 CA-CV 07-0514, 2008 WL 4329922, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2008)
(fixed price contract); Aleut Enters. v. Adak Seafood, LLC, No. 10-cv-0017-RRB,
2010 WL 3522348, at *1–2 (D. Alaska Sept. 2, 2010); Butterfield Plaza Benson, LLC
v. Johnson, No. 2 CA–CV 2010–0042, 2010 WL 4705181, at *4–5 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov.
19, 2010).
123. Ner Tamid Congregation of N. Town v. Krivoruchko, No. 08 C 1261, 2009 WL
10696538, at *11–13 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009) (missing a financing contingency); YPI 180
N. LaSalle Owner, LLC v. 180 N. LaSalle II, LLC, 933 N.E.2d 860, 866 (Ill. App. Ct.
2010) (missing a financing contingency); United States v. Sandwich Isles Commc’ns.,
Inc., 398 F. Supp. 3d 757, 772 (D. Haw. 2019); Next Gen Cap., LLC v. Consumer
Lending Assocs., 316 P.3d 598, 601 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
124. Achziger v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins., No. C14-5445 BHS, 2017 WL 5194914, at *7
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2017).
125. Indeck Energy, 2004 WL 2095554, at *11; French Camp Vineyards, 2005 Cal.
Super. LEXIS 1673, at *7.
126. YPI, 933 N.E.2d at 865–66; Pure Wafer Inc. v. City of Prescott, 845 F.3d 943,
957 (9th Cir. 2017); Alameda Belt Line v. City of Alameda, No. A118596, 2009 WL
1744543, at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. June 22, 2009); Confederated Tribes of the Warm
Springs Rsrv. v. Ambac Assur. Corp., No. 10-130-KI, 2010 WL 4875657, at *6 (D. Or.
Nov. 17, 2010).
127. Tahir v. Imp. Acquisition Motors, LLC, No. 09 C 6471, 2014 WL 985351, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2014).
128. Innovative Modular Sols. v. Hazel Crest Sch. Dist. 152.5, 965 N.E.2d 414,
421–22 (Ill. 2012); Mostardi Platt Env’t., Inc. v. Power Holdings, LLC, No. 2-13-0737,
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has become more expensive or difficult is not sufficient to excuse performance;129 (3) an alternative performance was available;130 and (4)
making a payment is never objectively impossible.131
TABLE 4: REASONS
Category
Event
Foreseeable
Contributed
Risk
Other

THE

7th Circuit
8
14
7
4
12

CCDS FAILED132
9th Circuit
28
21
13
11
19

Totals
36
35
20
15
31

The last two tables in this section—Tables 5 and 6—provide a more
granular look at the CCDs to get a better idea of how often parties
raise each doctrine; whether the doctrines were raised in combination
and, if so, how often; and how many times the paying party raised one
of the performance doctrines (i.e., impossibility or impracticability) or
2014 WL 2192965, at *17 (Ill. App. Ct. May 27, 2014); Ury v. Di Bari, No. 1-15-0277,
2016 WL 2610167, at *4 (Ill. App. Ct. May 5, 2016).
129. Prospect Enters. v. Ruff, No. 10-1026, 2011 WL 2683004, at *6–7 (C.D. Ill. July
11, 2011); Wolf v. Auxxi & Assocs., No. 2-11-0727, 2012 WL 6968932, at *5 (Ill. App.
Ct. Aug. 2, 2012); OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d
1214, 1222 (D. Haw. 2003); Cal. Bio-Mass v. City of San Bernadino, No. E037065,
2006 WL 2949565, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2006); Century Sur. Co. v. 350 W.A.,
LLC, No. 05-CV-1548-L(LSP), 2007 WL 2819668, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2007);
Mañay v. Acad. Exch. of Am., No. C07-5071 RBL, 2008 WL 820097, at *5 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 25, 2008); Rock & Stone Mfg. Inc. v. Allied Stone Sys., Inc., No. 1 CA-CV
07-0514, 2008 WL 4329922, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2008); Landon v. Nolen,
No. 2 CA-CV 2004-0193, 2005 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 268, at *8 (Ariz. Ct. App.
June 20, 2005).
130. Century, 2007 WL 2819668, at *10–11; In re Marriage of Archer, No. 1 CA-CV
08-0543, 2009 WL 1682146, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 16, 2009); M & I Bank, FSB v.
Coughlin, No. CV 09-02282-PHX-NVW, 2011 WL 5445416, at *7 (D. Ariz. Nov. 10,
2011); Bennett v. Foss, No. A137452, 2014 WL 1679559, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 29,
2014); Kische USA LLC v. Simsek, No. C16-0168JLR, 2017 WL 3895545, at *9 (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 6, 2017).
131. E.g., Seamen v. Valley Health Care Med. Grp., Inc., No. SA CV 13-1709-DOC
(RNBx), 2015 WL 9093593, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2015); see also Exec. Prop.
Mgmt., Inc. v. Watson, No. 1-10-1890, 2011 WL 10069467, at *6 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 29,
2011); Lutheran Homes, Inc. v. Lock Realty Corp. IX, No. 1:14-CV-102, 2015 WL
880644, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 2, 2015); PeopleSoft U.S.A., Inc. v. Softeck, Inc., 227 F.
Supp. 2d 1116, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Landover Corp. v. Bellevue Master, LLC, No.
C04-2407, 2006 WL 47662, at *14 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 6, 2006); Archundia v. Chase
Home Fin. LLC., No. 09–CV–00960, 2009 WL 1796295, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 23,
2009); Dauod v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., No. SACV 10-00302, 2010 WL 11595801, at *3
(C.D. Cal. July 29, 2010); Gutierrez v. PNC Mortg., No. 10cv01770, 2012 WL 1033063,
at *11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012); Wear v. Sierra Pac. Mortg. Co., No. C13–535, 2013
WL 6008498, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 2013); Deschaine v. IndyMac Mortg. Servs.,
No. CIV.2:13–1991, 2013 WL 6054456, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2013).
132. See Appendix 4 for the list of cases used in Table 4 (on file with Author).
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the performing party raised frustration of purpose. Table 5 tabulates
the data for impossibility and impracticability of performance; Table 6
does the same for frustration of purpose. For example, Table 5 shows
that impossibility was raised 14 times in the Seventh Circuit, and the
paying party raised it in 6 of those cases.133
TABLE 5: IMPOSSIBILITY & IMPRACTICABILITY
th

Impossibility
Impracticability
Both Is + Im
Is/Im + FoP
Total

7 Cir:
Total Cases
14
5
1
7
27

th

FoP
FoP + Is/Im
Totals

PERFORMANCE

7 Cir:
9 Cir:
Paying Party Total Cases
6
18
2
20
1
11
3
16
12 (44%)
65

TABLE 6: FRUSTRATION
7th Cir:
Tot Cases
9
1
10

OF

th

7th Cir:
Perf. Pty
2
0
2 (20%)

OF

9th Cir:
Paying Party
10
8
5
11
34 (52%)

PURPOSE

9th Cir:
Total Cases
21
13
34

9th Cir:
Perf Pty
4
4
8 (24%)

B. Some Observations
Based on the data collected for this Article, several things are worth
noting. For instance, notwithstanding the supposed shift from impossibility to impracticability sometime in the 1900s,134 impossibility is still
very much alive and well in both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.135 In
fact, impossibility is the performance doctrine raised most frequently
in the Seventh Circuit.136
Second, only under some states’ law within each circuit was performance excused based on a CCD. In the Seventh Circuit, those
states were Indiana (1)137 and Wisconsin (3).138 In the Ninth Circuit,
133. See Table 5.
134. See supra discussion accompanying notes 55–59.
135. See Table 5.
136. See Table 5, Appendix 5 (on file with Author).
137. See Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc. v. City of S. Bend, No. 71C01-1212-MI-00244,
2013 WL 3812025, at *5 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Feb. 20, 2013) (impracticability).
138. See Hugo Bramschreiber Asphalt Co. v. Midwest Amusement Park, LLC, No.
2006AP1205, 2006 WL 2671000, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2006) (impossibility);
Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 557 F.3d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 2009) (impossibility); Ryan v. Estate of Sheppard (In re Estate of Sheppard), 789 N.W.2d 616, 620
(Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (frustration of purpose).
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those states were Arizona (1),139 California (13),140 Hawaii (2),141
Montana (2),142 Oregon (1),143 and Washington (3).144
Third, force majeure clauses rarely appeared in the captured cases.
More specifically, there were only a total of two cases in the Seventh
Circuit145 and four cases in the Ninth Circuit146 that even mentioned a
force majeure clause.
To put the fourth observation into context, recall that even though
changed circumstances trigger the CCDs, each of the CCDs actually
139. See C.H. Robinson Co. v. Glob. Fresh, Inc., No. CV 08-2002-PHX-SRB, 2010
WL 11515522, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2010) (frustration of purpose).
140. See Credit Rsch., Inc. v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. H024220, 2003 WL
22133193, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2003) (impracticability); Praxis Dev. Grp., Inc.
v. Richman, Lawrence, Greene & Chizever, No. A104874, 2005 WL 1607784, at *8–9
(Cal. Ct. App. July 8, 2005) (impossibility); Miranda v. Williams, No. F054365, 2008
WL 4636445, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2008) (impossibility); Goldberg v. Prickett,
No. B203934, 2009 WL 179572, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2009) (frustration of
purpose); Pharmicare Co. v. Prosurg, Inc., No. CPF-08-509076, 2009 Cal. Super.
LEXIS 3780, at *10–11 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 5, 2009) (frustration of purpose); Klein v.
Klein, No. B213125, 2009 WL 3807442, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2009) (frustration
of purpose); Elsinore Hang Gliding Ass’n v. Concordia CKS Invs., LLC, No.
E046936, 2010 WL 3760247, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2010) (impossibility); Lane
v. Cooper, No. D062806, 2014 WL 606556, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2014) (impracticability); Sznyter v. Spun.com, Inc., No. D061832, 2014 WL 1654036, at *3–4 (Cal.
Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2014) (impossibility and impracticability); Maywood Police Officers
Ass’n v. City of Maywood, No. B256417, 2016 WL 399780, at *5–7 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb.
2, 2016) (impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose); Koka v. Koka,
No. B277116, 2017 WL 5898391, at *3–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2017) (impracticability). One case, Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga, was
counted twice because the court ruled on two different doctrines. 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813,
843 (Ct. App. 2009) (impossibility and commercial frustration).
141. See United States v. Pflueger, No. 06-00140 BMK, 2007 WL 1876028, at *4 (D.
Haw. June 27, 2007) (impracticability); One Wailea Dev., LLC v. Warren S. Unemori
Eng’g, Inc., No. CAAP–13–0000418, 2016 WL 2941062, at *12 (Haw. Ct. App. Apr.
20, 2016) (impracticability).
142. See Cape-France Enters. v. Estate of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011, 1016 (Mont. 2001)
(impossibility and impracticability); Cline v. Kralich, No. DA 16-2016, 2017 WL
3263081, ¶ 8 (Mont. Aug. 1, 2017) (impracticability).
143. See Chang v. Pacificorp, 157 P.3d 243, 257–58 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (frustration
of purpose).
144. See Ploegman v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. 46776–0–I, 2002 WL
1161387, at *2–3 (Wash. Ct. App. June 3, 2002) (impossibility and impracticability);
Evans v. County of Spokane, No. 19862–6–III, 2002 WL 1797485, at *7 (Wash. Ct.
App. Aug. 6, 2002) (impossibility and impracticability); Babcock v. ING Life Ins. &
Annuity Co., No. 12–CV–5093, 2013 WL 24372, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2013)
(impracticability).
145. Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 557 F.3d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 2009)
(impossibility); Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc. v. City of S. Bend, No. 71C01-1212-MI00244, 2013 WL 3812025, at *1 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Feb. 20, 2013) (impracticability).
146. OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216 (D.
Haw. 2003); French Camp Vineyards v. Guenoc Winery, Inc., No. CPF-04-504511,
2005 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1673, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 2005) (commercial impracticability); Pflueger, 2007 WL 1876028, at *2–3; Aleut Enter., LLC v. Adak Seafood, LLC, No. 3:10-cv-0017-RRB, 2010 WL 3522348, at *2 (D. Alaska Sept. 2, 2010)
(commercial impracticability).
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addresses a different performance related issue,147 which, according to
the conventional wisdom, means that impossibility and impracticability of performance are generally raised by the contracting party with
performance obligations while frustration of purpose is usually raised
by the paying party.148 The data suggest, however, that there may be
some substantive confusion by the litigants/attorneys raising the
CCDs and the courts deciding these cases regarding which CCD the
facts actually trigger and, therefore, the “correct” CCD to raise in litigation. This substantive confusion is evidenced both by the number of
cases in which a party raised one or both of the performance CCDs
and the frustration of purpose CCD (8 cases in the Seventh Circuit
and 29 in the Ninth Circuit, respectively),149 and the number of times
that the paying party raised one of the performance CCDs.150 With
respect to the latter observation, the paying party raised the performance CCD(s) in 12 of the 27 cases out of the Seventh Circuit.151 In
other words, the paying party raised a performance CCD 44% of the
time.152 In the Ninth Circuit, the paying party raised a performance
CCD in 34 of the 65 cases.153 This means that the paying party raised a
performance CCD 52% of the time.154 Even if the cases raising both
the performance CCDs and the frustration of purpose CCD are eliminated, leaving only the “pure” performance CCDs, the percentages
remain high—45% in the Seventh Circuit and 47% in the Ninth
Circuit.155
Fifth, a few words must be said about the successful CCD claims
and, more specifically, about the types of changed circumstances on
which they were premised. Recall that the changed circumstance (i.e.,
the event) that triggers the CCDs (a) will generally involve acts of
God or acts by third parties and (b) cannot be in the control of the
party seeking to excuse its performance. But if the other party caused
the event preventing the adversely affected party from performing,
then this should ordinarily be treated as a breach of contract by the
other party.156 Some takeaways from the successful claims in the Seventh Circuit (i.e., the cases that excused performance based on a
CCD) are as follows: (1) all involved events outside of the control of
147. See supra discussion accompanying notes 45–80 (providing a general overview
of CCDs).
148. See supra discussion accompanying notes 75–80 (discussing CCD conventional
wisdom).
149. See supra Tables 5 and 6.
150. See supra Table 5.
151. See supra Table 5.
152. See supra Table 5.
153. See supra Table 5.
154. See supra Table 5.
155. See supra Table 5.
156. See supra discussion accompanying notes 75–80 (conventional wisdom).
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either party;157 and (2) three of the four cases dealt with traditional
types of changed circumstances, namely, a thing necessary for performance failed to come into existence (two cases)158 or the death or
incapacity of a person necessary for performance (one case).159
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit cases are much less uniform with respect to the types of changed circumstances on which the 22 successful
claims were based.160 More specifically, 14 of the successful cases addressed changed circumstances outside of the control of either contracting party with 8 of these 13 cases based on traditional types of
changed circumstances161 and 6 on another event.162 For 7 of the 22
157. Hugo Bramschreiber Asphalt Co. v. Midwest Amusement Park, LLC, No.
2006AP1205, 2006 WL 2671000, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2006) (holding that a
third party supplier that failed to deliver asphalt to the plaintiff rendered plaintiff’s
performance impracticable); Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 557 F.3d 504,
509 (7th Cir. 2009) (ruling that the railroad was not responsible for transporting coal
to a power plant once the mine closed under the doctrine of impossibility); Specialty
Foods of Ind. v. City of S. Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23, 29 (Ind. Ct. of App. 2013) (excusing
performance from a contract due to impracticability when the College Football Hall
of Fame relocated from South Bend, Indiana to Atlanta, Geogia); Ryan v. Estate of
Sheppard (In re Estate of Sheppard), 789 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (determining that the death of a paying party amounted to frustration of purpose).
158. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 557 F.3d at 509 (ruling that the railroad was not responsible for transporting coal to a power plant once the mine closed under the doctrine of
impossibility); Specialty Foods of Ind., 997 N.E.2d 23, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (excusing performance from a contract due to impracticability when the College Football
Hall of Fame relocated from South Bend, Indiana to Atlanta, Georgia); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 263 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
159. In re Estate of Sheppard, 789 N.W.2d at 620 (determining that death of a paying party amounted to frustration of purpose); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTS. § 262.
160. One of the successful claims was counted twice—once for impossibility and
once for frustration of purpose—because both doctrines were decided in the case. See
Habitat Tr. for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 843
(Ct. App. 2009). That said, for purposes of discussing the event that gave rise to the
successful claim, the same case was only counted once. As a result, the discussion of
the 22 successful claims results in a case count of 21 when the specific events are
examined.
161. Praxis Dev. Grp. v. Richman, Lawrence, Greene & Chizever, No. A104874,
2005 WL 1607784, at *7–8 (Cal. Ct. App. July 8, 2005) (determining that the doctrine
of impossibility applied when a City did not approve interchange agreement necessary
for development project); Miranda v. Williams, No. F054365, 2008 WL 4636445, at *4
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2008) (holding that performance was excused under the doctrine of impossibility when the City refused to move a sewer line or issue a permit to
build over it); Goldberg v. Prickett, No. B203934, 2009 WL 179572, at *4 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 27, 2009) (finding that when a 1031 exchange fell through on a property, the
contract’s purpose was frustrated); Pharmicare Co. v. Prosurg, Inc., No. CPF-08509076, 2009 Cal. Super. LEXIS 3780, at *10–11 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 6, 2009) (ruling
that a contract’s purpose was frustrated when contracted products failed to satisfy
testing standards set by Korean equivalent of FDA and therefore could not be sold in
Korea); Klein v. Klein, No. B213125, 2009 WL 3807442, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 16,
2009) (finding that the doctrine of frustration of purpose applied when the child for
whom child support was owed died); Habitat Tr., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 843 (asserting
that the doctrines of impossibility and frustration of purpose excused performance
after the City determined that Plaintiff was not a qualified conservation entity and did
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cases, the changed circumstances were within the control of one of the
contracting parties, with 5 of these events in the control of the nonadversely affected party163 and 2 in the control of the party seeking to
excuse its own performance.164 With respect to the five cases with
not qualify to hold the mitigation land); Elsinore Hang Gliding Ass’n v. Concordia
CKS Invs., LLC, No. E044307, 2010 WL 3760247, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2010)
(affirming the trial court’s finding that performance was impossible when the Riverside County Flood Control District failed to approve a hang-gliding easement); Babcock v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., No. 12-CV-5093-TOR, 2013 WL 24372, at *6
(E.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2013) (granting summary judgment to defendant insurance company after defendant failed to make further payments from structured settlement
pending further proceedings in Ohio, which rendered performance impossible); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 264.
162. Cape-Frances Enters. v. Estate of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011, 1015–16 (Mont. 2001)
(finding that a discovery of underground pollution caused performance to be impossible and impracticable); Credit Rsch., Inc. v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. H024220,
2003 WL 22133193, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2003) (determining that when a third
party cut off database access, it rendered performance impracticable); Chang v.
Pacificorp, 157 P.3d 243, 247–48 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (ruling that the unprecedented
manipulation of California’s energy market by third parties constituted as frustration
of purpose); Lane v. Cooper, No. D062806, 2014 WL 606556, at *7–8 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 18, 2014) (asserting that performance was impracticable when an architectural
jury referenced in CCRs no longer existed); One Wailea Dev., LLC v. Warren S.
Unemori Eng’g, Inc., No. CAAP-13-0000418, 2016 WL 2941062, at *12, 29–32 (Haw.
Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016) (holding that the doctrine of impracticability excused defendant’s performance when plaintiff’s breach of contract with a third party caused the
third party to cancel the land sales contract for the property for which defendant’s
services were required); Koka v. Koka, No. B277116, 2017 WL 5898391, at *3–4 (Cal.
Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2017) (finding that the doctrine of impracticability applied to contractual performance when mediator specified in the parties’ agreement retired).
163. Ploegman v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., Co., No. 46776-0-I, 2002 WL
1161387, at *2–3 (Wash. Ct. App. June 3, 2002) (excusing plaintiff’s performance by
the impossibility and impracticability doctrines when defendant railroad leased property to a third party without reserving right for plaintiff to enter and cut vegetation);
Evans v. Cnty. of Spokane, No. 19862-6-III, 2002 WL 1797485, at *6–7 (Wash. Ct.
App. Aug. 6, 2002) (finding that defendant county’s performance was excused due to
impossibility and impracticability when plaintiffs improperly installed a sewer/septic
system, which led to ongoing violations of health regulations); C.H. Robinson Co. v.
Glob. Fresh, Inc., No. CV 08-2002, 2010 WL 11515522, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2010)
(discharging defendant’s performance because the contract’s purpose was frustrated
when plaintiff issued voluntary recall of melons after FDA issud warnings regarding
melons); Maywood Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Maywood, No. B256417, 2016 WL
399780, at *5–7 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2016) (ruling that the doctrines of impossibility,
impracticability, and frustration of purpose release the defendant from performing
after plaintiff police department’s frequency and severity of liability claims caused the
defendant city to lose its insurance coverage); Cline v. Kralich, No. DA 16-0216, 2017
WL 3263081, at *2 (Mont. Aug. 1, 2017) (finding that by failing to provide defendant
with notice required by the parties’ agreement, plaintiff caused defendant’s performance to be impracticable and therefore excused).
164. United States v. Pflueger, No. 06-00140, 2007 WL 1876028, at *3–4 (D. Haw.
June 27, 2007) (excusing defendant’s performance due to impracticability when defendant was unable to obtain a surety bond required to remediate under consent decree
after dam partially owned by defendant broke, causing damage and death); Sznyter v.
Spun.com, Inc., No. D061832, 2014 WL 1654036, at *3–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2014)
(affirming that the defendant’s performance was excused due to impracticability after
defendant became insolvent and merged with another company, which triggered Del-
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events in the control of the non-adversely affected party, three involve
what looks like a breach by the non-adversely affected party.165 This
data, therefore, also suggests that there is substantive confusion about
the CCDs in practice, particularly in the Ninth Circuit.
Finally, the particular problems presented by the frustration of purpose doctrine need to be noted, particularly because a lot of people
and businesses affected by the Covid-19 pandemic will be the paying
parties. Recall that conventional contract wisdom tells us that frustration of purpose is generally raised by the paying party and that courts
are much more reluctant to excuse performance based on this
doctrine.166
While none of the CCDs are generally successful when raised in
litigation, frustration of purpose is still less successful in practice than
impossibility and impracticability of performance.167 More specifically, impossibility and impracticability failed 85% of the time and
frustration of purpose failed 90% of the time in the Seventh Circuit.168
In the Ninth Circuit, impossibility and impracticability failed 75% of
the time and frustration of purpose failed 82% of the time.169 That
frustration of purpose is generally less successful than either of the
two performance doctrines is particularly significant given that data
for frustration of purpose was only collected over a ten-year period
(2005–2015) while data for impossibility and impracticability of performance spanned a twenty-year period (2000–2019).170
The cases highlight why frustration of purpose will generally be
more difficult to establish than impossibility or impracticability of performance. To begin with, the CCD cases make clear that making payments required under a contract is never objectively impossible.171 So
impossibility is never going to excuse performance by a paying party.
As for impracticability and frustration of purpose, the CCD cases
aware law resulting in cancelation of all existing stock shares for nominal
consideration).
165. Ploegman v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., Co., No. 46776-0-I, 2002 WL
1161387, at *2–3 (Wash. Ct. App. June 3, 2002) (defendant railroad leased property to
a third party without reserving right for plaintiff to enter and cut vegetation);
Maywood Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Maywood, No. B256417, 2016 WL 399780,
at *5–7 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2016) (defendant city terminated its memo of understanding with plaintiff police department because the frequency and severity of liability claims against the police department caused the defendant city to lose its insurance
coverage); Cline v. Kralich, No. DA 16-0216, 2017 WL 3263081, at *2 (Mont. Aug. 1,
2017) (finding that plaintiff breached the contract with defendant by failing to provide
defendant with notice required by the parties’ agreement and that the breach caused
defendant’s performance (providing plaintiff with 30 days to cure) to be
impracticable).
166. See supra discussion accompanying notes 76–79.
167. See supra Table 3.
168. See supra Table 3.
169. See supra Table 3.
170. See supra Subsection II.A.1 (detailing the Article’s methodology).
171. See supra discussion accompanying note 131.
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make clear that (1) a party’s financial ability to perform its own duties
under a contract is never an excuse for nonperformance and (2) an
increase in the expense or difficulty of performance is not sufficient to
excuse performance—even if the event causing the expense or difficulty is a housing and/or market collapse or an economic disaster.172
This, of course, means that impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose will rarely excuse the paying party’s performance
either.
Another reason frustration of purpose is more difficult to establish
in practice is because of the doctrine’s “common understanding” requirement. Recall that frustration of purpose generally requires the
adversely affected party to show that its principal purpose for the contract has been frustrated and that the parties share some kind of common understanding of that purpose.173 Proving that both parties to the
contract shared a common understanding generally is very difficult, if
not outright impossible, to do.174
Consider two examples: (1) Parties enter a residential housing
agreement (either lease or mortgage); the common understanding of
the parties is probably (and simply) the ability of the paying party to
possess the premises as a place to live in exchange for money. (2) Parties enter a lease agreement involving commercial property; the common understanding of the parties is probably (and simply) the ability
of the tenant to possess the premises for commercial purposes (i.e., for
a restaurant, a clothing or hardware store, a software developer’s office, etc.) in exchange for money. Suddenly, the COVID–19 pandemic
strikes and shuts down the economy. People lose jobs; businesses lose
customers.175
There are three intertwined problems now confronting the paying
parties (i.e., the residential renters/mortgagors and commercial lessees). First, the common understanding of the parties remains completely intact, even when faced with the economic devastation caused
by the COVID–19 pandemic.176 The paying party still has the right to
possess the residential or commercial premises for its housing or its
172. See supra discussion accompanying notes 156–57.
173. See supra discussion accompanying notes 64–72 (discussing frustration of
purpose).
174. See, e.g., Alameda Belt Line v. City of Alameda, No. A118596, 2009 WL
1744543, at *14–16 (Cal. Ct. App. June 22, 2009); Liberty Dialysis–Haw., LLC v.
Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., No. 07-00286, 2009 WL 1789332, at *11 (D. Haw.
June 19, 2009); Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Rsrv. v. Ambac Assur.
Corp., No. 10-130, 2010 WL 4875657, at *6 (D. Or. Nov. 17, 2010). For an earlier case
outside the parameters of this empirical study, see 7200 Scottsdale Road General Partners v. Kuhn Farm Machinery, Inc., 909 P.2d 408, 418 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
175. See supra discussion accompanying note 17–23.
176. See Hanoch Dagan & Ohad Somech, When Contract’s Basic Assumptions Fail,
CAN. J.L. & JURIS. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 30) (available at https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3605411 [https://perma.cc/2G3A-9NTB]).
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business.177 But the paying party either (1) can no longer pay for that
right of possession or (2) sees paying as more expensive or difficult.178
Second, the paying party’s ability to pay (i.e., to perform its own duty
under a contract) is never going to be the common understanding of
the parties going into any contract.179 And third, inability to pay for
whatever reason (i.e., it’s become more expensive or difficult) is simply not an excuse for nonperformance—even when the cause of the
paying party’s financial difficulties is a catastrophic event.180 All this
means, of course, that paying parties cannot excuse themselves from
performance under the frustration of purpose doctrine.
In sum, the primary conclusion from the data collected for this empirical study is that contract law via the CCDs will, with a few exceptions, let the loss lie where it falls and leave the contracting parties
exactly where it finds them, namely, in breach of their contracts. And
this is true even when the changed circumstance triggering the invocation of one of the CCDs is catastrophic, like the housing market crash
that precipitated the Great Recession. Paying parties in particular will
have a harder time excusing their performance using any of the CCDs.
III. SEARCHING

IN

ALL

THE

WRONG PLACES

That the CCDs are not generally successful when raised in practice
is consistent with CCD literature spanning 70 years.181 That said, the
literature reflects a lack of consensus on what the CCDs actually do
when they are being employed and even on the theoretical justifications for them. Some contracts scholars, including Melvin Eisenberg,
argue that the CCDs serve a gap-filling function, much like implied
terms.182 Other scholars, including Richard Posner, Andrew Rosenfield, and George Triantis, argue that the CCDs are risk-allocation de177. Putzier & Fung, supra note 7.
178. See id.
179. Dagan & Somech, supra note 180 (manuscript at 28–29).
180. See supra Table 2.
181. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 33, at 1, 21–22; Rapsomanikis, supra note 33, at
558; Hubbard, supra note 33, at 80; Trakman, supra note 33, at 477; Kull, supra note
33, at 1; Weiskopf, supra note 33, at 242; Roberts, supra note 33, at 129; Van Boom,
supra note 33, at 4–5.
182. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 207, 209 (2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Impossibility] (“The methodological proposition is that the tacit assumptions of contracting parties, like other
implied contractual terms, are normally best determined by considering what similarly
situated parties would likely have assumed.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 49, at 623
(“When a court excuses a party on the ground of impossibility, it is supplying a term
to deal with an omitted case, to fill a gap.”); cf. Kull, supra note 33, at 7 (“[T]he
contemporary formulation of the problem sees the frustrated contract as ‘incomplete,’
in that it did not define expressly the obligations of the parties upon the occurrence of
the frustrating event, and thus assigns to the court the task of supplying a ‘gap-filling’
term.”).
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vices.183 Still other scholars, including Leon Trakman, argue that the
CCDs should address loss allocation.184 The theoretical justifications
served by the CCDs range from fairness (Perillo, Liu, and Jenkins)185
and efficiency (Posner and Rosenfield)186 to autonomy (Dagan and
Somech)187 and freedom of contract (Roberts, Triantis, and Van
Boom).188 This confusion surrounding the CCDs has been noted for
decades.189
In addition to the differing approaches to the CCDs both practically
and theoretically, the literature also takes one of two positions with
respect to how broadly the CCDs should be construed in practice.
More specifically, some contracts scholars argue that the CCDs should
be construed as a very limited exception to the general rule that contracts should be strictly enforced while other scholars argue that the
CCDs should not be recognized at all. Leon Trakman aptly summed
up the limited exception position and the reasoning supporting it as
follows:
[M]any courts tend to view excuse for nonperformance as a very
narrow concept that should not be readily used to terminate contractual obligations. These courts reason that because there are few
disruptions of performance that parties could not foresee in modern
times of political and economic uncertainty, parties engaged in commercial transaction should be bound to fulfill their unqualified
promises without excuse. Moreover, a promisor who assumes an obligation without obtaining a contingent release clause should not be
permitted to escape liability for breach at the expense of the
promisee.190
183. See generally Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 47; George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 450, 451 (1992).
184. Trakman, supra note 33, at 480 (“Past experience in both common- and civillaw jurisdictions demonstrates that the allocation of losses arising from nonperformance is a logical and equitable alternative to the imposition of the full loss upon one
contracting party.”).
185. Significantly, the “fairness” rationale is articulated mostly by authors doing
comparative law work about the CCDs. See Joseph M. Perillo, Force Majeure and
Hardship Under the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 5
TUL. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 5, 12 (1997); Chengwei, supra note 55, § 19.3.2; Sarah
Howard Jenkins, Exemption for Nonperformance: UCC, CISG, UNIDROIT Principles—A Comparative Assessment, 72 TUL. L. REV. 2015, 2017–19 (1998).
186. See generally Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 47.
187. See, e.g., Dagan & Somech, supra note 180 (manuscript at 3–5, 16).
188. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 33, at 136; Triantis, supra note 187, at 480; Van
Boom, supra note 33, at 1.
189. See, e.g., Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 47, at 84–88; Rapsomanikis, supra
note 33, at 558.
190. Trakman, supra note 33, at 479 (emphasis removed) (footnote omitted); see
also Chengwei, supra note 55, at 243; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS., ch. 11,
intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1981); Roberts, supra note 33, at 143 (“Exceptions to this
principle [i.e., sanctity of contract] should only be made where too strict adherence to
the principle would be detrimental to another important interest.”); cf. Dagan &
Somech, supra note 180 (manuscript at 6, 35) (arguing that though the CCDs are not a
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Other scholars, like George Triantis, Andrew Kull, and Thomas
Roberts, argued, however, the CCDs should not be recognized at all
because (1) the parties have already explicitly or implicitly allocated
all the potential risks in their contract;191 (2) the CCDs are self-defeating and would “work[ ] against the very advantages which contracts
are intended to secure[,]” namely, risk distribution;192 (3) the courts
have no standards by which to choose where the losses or gains from a
contract should fall between the parties to a contract;193 (4) judicial
intervention has little social and economic utility and could operate to
disincentivize the parties from allocating the risks between themselves;194 and (5) exploitation is not necessarily relevant for the law.195
Despite all these differences, contracts scholars and courts all seem
to agree that one way to ensure CCDs will work in practice is for the
future adversely affected party to include a provision in the contract
to protect itself against changed circumstances that might occur later.
An example Eisenberg used is instructive:
[If] A knows or should know the risk of unexpected subsoil conditions, and B does not[, then], if A wishes either to be excused if such
conditions materialize or to put the risk of such conditions on B, A
should bring the risk to B’s attention and explicitly contract around
it.196

Dagan and Somech agree. They argue, for example, that contract
law must follow relational justice, meaning that the law should maintain the ability of both parties to achieve the goal they set for themselves when they co-authored the shared script, that is, when they codrafted their contract.197 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
probably makes the point the most succinctly:
The obligor is . . . liable in damages for breach of contract even if he
is without fault and even if circumstances have made the contract
more burdensome or less desirable than he had anticipated. . . . The
obligor who does not wish to undertake so extensive an obligation
may contract for a lesser one by using a variety of common
clauses.198
marginal part of contract law, the CCDs will generally not be successful when raised,
therefore supporting the position that the CCDs are actually limited exceptions to the
general rule of strict liability in contract).
191. Triantis, supra note 187, at 480.
192. Roberts, supra note 33, at 144–45.
193. Kull, supra note 33, at 40.
194. Id. at 52; Weiskopf, supra note 33, at 270–71.
195. Roberts, supra note 33, at 136–37 (“[W]here one party exploits the pressing
need of the other party by inducing agreement on terms highly unsatisfactory for the
latter, this exploitation is not necessarily of any relevance for the law, even though
such action may be morally reprehensible.”).
196. Eisenberg, Impossibility, supra note 186, at 221 (emphasis added).
197. Dagan & Somech, supra note 180 (manuscript at 19, 22, 48-49, 64).
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. ch. 11, intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1981)
(emphasis added); see also Anderson, supra note 33, at 22; Rapsomanikis, supra note

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-2\TWL203.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 37

IF PAST IS PROLOGUE

10-MAR-22

14:15

383

The courts are in accord. In United States v. Sandwich Isles Communications, Inc.,199 for example, the district court said that impracticability of performance is premised on the idea that “‘the parties will
have bargained with respect to any risks that are both within their
contemplation and central to the substance of the contract’. . . . And
‘if the risk was foreseeable there should have been provision for it in
the contract, and the absence of such a provision gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed.’”200
At a minimum, the “insert a clause in the contract” solution assumes that future adversely affected parties are either (1) drafting the
contracts they are entering into with their contracting partners (or
have meaningful input into the drafting process), and/or (2) have the
wherewithal—meaning the knowledge, time, access to information
and advice, money, the list goes on—to not only insist on the inclusion
of such a clause in those contracts but to also see to it that the clause
actually ends up in the written documents.
These assumptions may describe how some contracts are formed,
but they do not describe the way most contracts are formed. Adhesion
contracts—contracts drafted by one party usually but not always on a
standard form and presented to the other party on a take it or leave
basis201—are ubiquitous in consumer202 and employment contracts,203
online contracts (e.g., buying anything off a website),204 and even a lot
of business contracts, particularly those involving small businesses.
One need look no further than the pervasive use of mandatory arbitration provisions in contracts between corporations and consum33, at 601–02; Chengwei, supra note 55, at § 19.2; Van Boom, supra note 33, at 13;
Eisenberg, Impossibility, supra note 186, at 221; Kull, supra note 33, at 50–51; Roberts, supra note 33, at 145; Jenkins, supra note 189, at 2017.
199. United States v. Sandwich Isles Commc’ns, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 3d 757 (D. Haw.
2019).
200. Id. at 772 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v.
Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 905 (1996)). A specific clause in the contract allocates
risk to the adversely affected party. And the absence of a specific clause in the contract allocates the risk to the adversely affected party.
201. Rakoff, supra note 98, at 1176–77.
202. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346–47 (2011) (“[T]he
times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”);
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY § 1.1 (2015) (“Whenever a
consumer obtains a consumer financial product such as a credit card, a checking account, or a payday loan, he or she typically receives the company’s standard form,
written legal contract.”).
203. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C. L.
REV. 427, 428 (2016) (“[Workers are] often presented with a set of non-negotiable
terms . . . and asked to accept on the implicit or explicit threat of termination.”); see
also Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 638 (2007).
204. See generally, NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 53–54 (2013) (explaining that wrap contracts—a type of online contract—are
similar to adhesion contracts).
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ers,205 employees,206 and small businesses207 to see the truth of this
conclusion.208
Given that adhesive contracts are so ubiquitous, it is striking that
adhesive contracts do not appear to be the typical type of contracts
captured in the case law study for this Article, though they are present
in the data.209 What is equally striking is that most contracts in the
captured cases instead appear to be commercial contracts between
commercial parties.210 Clearly, the data captured at least two very different types of contracts.
These data points present an obvious question: What accounts for
or explains the abundance of commercial contracts and the dearth of
adhesive contracts in the captured cases?
One reason the data suggests why so many more commercial contracts ended up in court is because so few of the contracts captured in
the study included force majeure clauses. More specifically, a force
majeure clause was mentioned in only 2 (5%) out of the 37 cases from
the Seventh Circuit211 and in only 4 (4%) of the 99 cases out of the
Ninth Circuit.212 “Force majeure” literally means “an event or effect
that cannot be reasonably anticipated or controlled.”213 The primary
purpose of a force majeure clause, therefore, is to allocate between
the contracting parties the risk that future events will prevent contract
performance.214 Hence, when it comes to the CCDs, the most directly
applicable contract clause is a force majeure provision.215
So a more specific question presented with respect to these commercial contracts is why did so few of them include a force majeure
clause. The lack of force majeure clauses might suggest that the commercial cases captured in the study conducted for this Article are not
205. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. 333.
206. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Lamps Plus, Inc. v.
Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
207. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
208. Cf. Jeffrey C. Bright, Unilateral Attorney’s Fees Clauses: A Proposal to Shift to
the Golden Rule, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 85, 88 n.8 (2012) (“In my personal experience
practicing law, it is standard for one-sided attorney’s fees clauses to be included in
mortgages, residential and commercial leases, and occasionally in sales of goods and
services to small businesses.”).
209. See supra discussion accompanying notes 95–99; see also supra Table 1; Appendix 1 (on file with Author).
210. See supra discussion accompanying notes 95–99; see also supra Table 1.
211. See supra discussion accompanying note 145.
212. See supra discussion accompanying note 146.
213. Force majeure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/force%2majeure [https://perma.cc/DZ39-F5VL].
214. Benoliel, supra note 48, at 402.
215. Indeed, one contract scholar went so far as to argue that “the wide-spread use
of force majeure clauses [in contracts] that provide for events with catastrophic consequences” was the reason that courts did not need to fill in any gaps in the parties’
contract and, therefore why the CCDs were not needed at all. Triantis, supra note 187,
at 451–52.
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the typical type of cases in which a party would normally raise a
CCD.216 Implicit in this argument are the assumptions that a more
standard CCD case would have included a force majeure clause and
that the force majeure clause would have been successful if it had
been invoked.217 It is not clear how robust this argument and its assumptions are given that (1) this empirical study captured 136 cases,
98 of which appear to be commercial contracts between commercial
parties,218 suggesting that the cases captured are a representative sample of the types of commercial cases that are litigated and in which a
CCD is raised;219 (2) a recent empirical study conducted by Uri Benoliel concluded that sophisticated parties220 are actually not including
force majeure clauses in their commercial contracts (66% of the 1,926
contracts collected for his study);221 and (3) even if included in the
contract, force majeure clauses may not necessarily resolve the dispute between the parties either before or after litigation is filed.
Anecdotally, in the empirical study conducted here, performance
was only excused in three of the six cases that discuss a force majeure
clause,222 and even then, the force majeure clause was the reason performance was excused in only one of those cases.223 Performance was
not excused in the other three cases, notwithstanding the presence of a
force majeure clause in each of those cases, either because the clause
was interpreted very narrowly such that it did not apply to the circumstances being alleged or the event was foreseeable.224 Indeed, force
216. Thanks go to Stephen Sepinuck for raising this point.
217. If a force majeure clause were included in these contracts, the argument is that
these cases would be less likely to be litigated. This is because the contract itself via
the force majeure clause would resolve the dispute.
218. See supra discussion accompanying notes 95–99.
219. See supra discussion accompanying notes 95–99.
220. See Benoliel, supra note 48, at 409–10 (explaining that at least one of the parties in each of the studied contracts was a sophisticated party, which is defined as “a
sophisticated company that is legally required to report to the SEC. These are normally companies with more than $10 million in assets.”).
221. Id. at 412.
222. Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 557 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2009) (impossibility); Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013) (impracticability); United States v. Pflueger, No. 06–00140 BMK, 2007 WL
1876028 (D. Haw. June 27, 2007) (impracticability).
223. Specialty Foods, 997 N.E.2d at 29 (holding that the Football Hall of Fame moving to another state was a force majeure event within the “any other reason” language
of the contract’s force majeure clause, excusing performance); Wis. Elec., 557 F.3d at
507 (asserting that the force majeure clause did not specify the circumstances that
would make performance impossible or excuse the performing party from performing
the contract); Pflueger, 2007 WL 1876028, at *3–4 (ruling that force majeure clause
did not excuse performance because a procedural aspect of the clause was not complied with).
224. OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1224 (D.
Haw. 2003) (interpreting the force majeure clause to not excuse performance based
on poor economic conditions); French Camp Vineyards v. Guenoc Winery, No. CPF04-504511, 2005 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1673, at *7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 2005) (finding
that the force majeure clause did not excuse performance because the cyclical nature
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majeure clauses are always subject to interpretation225 with the consensus being that courts generally construe these clauses narrowly.226
According to one court, force majeure clauses are now “little more
than a descriptive phrase without much inherent substance.”227
The absence of force majeure clauses from the commercial contracts captured in this case law study, therefore, could actually suggest
that the commercial parties to these commercial contracts are explicitly opting for default rules,228 which, in the absence of a risk-allocation clause, would include the CCDs.229 Another way to state this
particular theory would be to say that these commercial parties are
overtly rejecting the “insert a clause in the contract” solution favored
by pundits and courts. This could very well explain why so many of the
commercial contracts captured here ended up in litigation. Assuming,
therefore, that these are in fact co-drafted contracts between sophisticated commercial parties who are intentionally opting for the CCDs
as default rules by choosing not to include a risk-allocation clause in
their contracts,230 then it is entirely plausible that the courts are applyof the wine grape market in California was foreseeable); Aleut Enter., LLC v. Adak
Seafood, LLC, No. 3:10-cv-0017, 2010 WL 3522348, at *1–2 (D. Alaska Sept. 2, 2010)
(determining that the force majeure clause did not excuse performance because the
adversely affected party’s inability to obtain fuel was foreseeable).
225. See, e.g., Wis. Elec., 557 F.3d at 507 (“[A] force majeure clause must always be
interpreted in accordance with its language and context, like any other provision in a
written contract . . . .”); Specialty Foods, 997 N.E.2d at 26 (“The objective of a court
when it interprets a contract, including a force majeure provision, is to determine the
intent of the parties at the time the contract was made by examining the language
used in the contract.”).
226. See, e.g., Gordon Firemark, A New Look at the Old Standard: “Force Majeure”
Clauses, L. OFFS. GORDON P. FIREMARK (Mar. 19, 2020), https://firemark.com/2020/
03/19/a-new-look-at-the-old-standard-force-majeure-clauses/ [https://perma.cc/PT5AA5VB]; Janice M. Ryan, Understanding Force Majeure Clauses, VENABLE LLP (Feb.
2011), https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2011/02/understanding-forcemajeure-clauses [https://perma.cc/N838-BLLN]; Lawrence P. Rochefort & Rachel E.
McRoskey, The Coronavirus and Force Majeure Clauses in Contracts, AKERMAN
(Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.akerman.com/en/perspectives/the-coronavirus-and-forcemajeure-clauses-in-contracts.html [https://perma.cc/LQ32-KBMZ]; P. Danielle Cortez
& Jason B. Sims, Boilerplate Contract Language Coming to the Forefront: Force
Majeure Clauses and COVID-19, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.natlaw
review.com/article/boilerplate-contract-language-coming-to-forefront-force-majeureclauses-and-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/M5CY-C98X].
227. Specialty Foods, 997 N.E.2d at 27 (quoting Sun Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Holt,
984 S.W.2d 277, 283 (Tex. App. 1998)).
228. See Benoliel, supra note 48, at 412 (concluding that “most parties prefer not to
contract around the default allocation of risks provided under the impossibility doctrine” after finding that most of the commercial contracts collected for his study did
not include force majeure provisions).
229. See, e.g., Wis. Elec., 557 F.3d at 506 (“Parties can . . . contract around [impossibility], because it is just a gap filler . . . .”).
230. But the entire argument in the text only holds true if the assumptions made
also hold true; however, it is not entirely clear from the data that all of the assumptions hold true. The information about the parties in the cases is quite thin, and there
is rarely any information about how or if the contract was negotiated or how it was
drafted. See supra discussion accompanying notes 163–203.
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ing the CCDs correctly in these cases. In other words, that the CCDs
do not excuse performance most of the time and instead impose all
the risk and attendant loss on one of the contracting commercial parties may be the correct result, again depending on whether the assumptions made about these contracts and the contracting parties
hold true.
The same reasons, however, do not explain the absence of adhesion
contracts in the empirical study conducted here. That said, and to cut
right to the chase, the dearth of adhesive contracts is not surprising
given the host of barriers that make it extremely difficult to litigate a
contract claim in court. To begin with, Eric Zacks has shown that contracts are specifically drafted to take advantage of non-drafting parties’ cognitive biases and to discourage non-drafting parties from
challenging even unconscionable or illegal contracts.231 Contracts are
drafted, in other words, to encourage non-drafting parties to not file a
claim. And if the claim is small, the non-drafting party would most
likely not want to file a lawsuit232 because a lawsuit would cost significantly more than the claim at stake.233 But even if a non-drafting party
wants to pursue a contract claim in court, that party will probably have
to find an attorney willing to represent it. Private attorneys, however,
are most likely not going to be willing (or able) to litigate small, individual claims (either for a plaintiff or a defendant) because it would
simply not be worth the attorney’s time to do so.234 While aggregating
these claims would make pursuing contract claims more attractive, aggregating claims is not viable in many cases and is rarely an easy op231. Eric Zacks, Shame, Regret, and Contract Design, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 695,
741–46 (2014).
232. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1633 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that claims against employers were “small, scarcely of a size warranting the expense of seeking redress alone” for individual employees alleging
underpayment in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Michael Heller & Rick
Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1524 (2008) (“[P]laintiffs
with small stakes might . . . have insufficient reason to hire a lawyer to vindicate their
claims.”).
233. LAWS. FOR CIV. JUST., CIV. JUST. REFORM GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES, USCOURTS.GOV 2
(May 2010), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/litigation_cost_survey_of_ma
jor_companies_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H6L-7D6K] (“[H]igh transaction costs of litigation, and in particular the costs of discovery, threaten to exceed the amount at issue
in all but the largest cases.”).
234. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the
Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”);
Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits,
as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”) (emphasis omitted); cf. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1217 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (“[F]ew firms, no
matter how large or well financed, will have any incentive to represent the small stake
holders in class actions against corporate America, no matter how worthy the cause or
wrongful the defendant’s conduct.”).
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tion given that (1) federal statutes235 and recent United States
Supreme Court decisions236 make class actions harder to litigate and
(2) class action waivers are routinely found in boilerplate sections of
adhesion contracts.237
Finally, even if a non-drafting party in an adhesive contract is willing to bring a contract claim and is able to find an attorney willing to
file that claim in court, the non-drafting party will be confronted with
another clause in the boilerplate of the contract, namely, a mandatory
arbitration provision.238 The only purpose of a mandatory arbitration
clause is to require disputes between the parties to be resolved in an
arbitration proceeding.239 Given that courts routinely enforce
mandatory arbitration clauses,240 the vast majority of all contracts
with such a clause will most likely not be litigated.241 Hence, and for
all of the reasons discussed, it is not surprising that the empirical study
conducted here did not capture many adhesion contracts.
235. E.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (reducing the number of multistate
class actions, the number of national class actions, and the number of state court actions); see also Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1606 (2006).
236. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (interpreting Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that consequentially increased the difficulty in
filing class action claims).
237. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 333 (consumer wireless service contracts); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (business credit
card agreements); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1612 (2018) (employment
contracts); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019) (employment contracts).
238. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (April 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-ofmandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-millionamerican-workers/ [https://perma.cc/JPK3-ME2M] (finding that more than 60 million
American workers are subject to mandatory arbitration); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 206, § 1.4.1 (“Tens of millions of consumers use financial products
or services that are subject to pre-dispute arbitration clauses.”).
239. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 206, § 1.1 (“[I]f one side sues the
other in court, the party that has been sued in court can invoke the arbitration clause
to require that the dispute proceed, if at all, in arbitration instead.”).
240. See supra notes 205–07 (listing United States Supreme Court arbitration
cases).
241. To get a sense of the sheer number of contracts subject to a mandatory arbitration clause, see, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 206, § 2.3 (finding
that 53% of outstanding credit card loans, 44% of insured deposits at financial institutions, 92% of prepaid credit card agreements, and 83.7% of payday lenders all included mandatory arbitration provisions in their contracts); Colvin, supra note 242. A
2012 report by Public Citizen documented the problems litigants were facing in court
in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Concepcion decision and identified 76 cases in
which courts cited Concepcion to hold that class action waivers in mandatory arbitration provisions were enforceable; the litigants were therefore required to assert their
claims individually in front of an arbitrator. Christine Hines, Negah Mouzoon & Taylor Lincoln, Cong. Watch, Justice Denied: One Year Later: The Harms to Consumers
from the Supreme Court’s Concepcion Decision Are Plainly Evident, PUB. CITIZEN 4
(Apr. 2012), http://www.citizen.org/documents/concepcion-anniversary-justice-denied-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX2L-HTJ8].
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But could the “insert a clause in the contract” solution favored by
contracts scholars and courts nevertheless be a workable solution in
the context of adhesion contracts? The short answer is no. Recall that
the “insert a clause in the contract” solution assumes either that both
parties are drafting the contract together or the future adversely affected party can actually ensure that such a clause makes its way into
the parties’ written contract. Neither of these presuppositions are correct in the context of adhesive contracts. The crazy thing is that everyone who writes about or deals with contracts and contract law on any
kind of a regular basis already knows this and has known it for a long
time.
For starters, adhesion contracts by definition are not drafted by
both parties.242 Instead, adhesion contracts are generally drafted by
only one of the contracting parties and presented to the non-drafter
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.243
Further, the future adversely affected party has the ability to insist
on the inclusion of a clause in the contract protecting against future
contingencies only if that party already has salient information about
the relevant clause or that party can obtain such information at a tolerable cost (in terms of time, money, and effort).244 But most parties
either do not want to expend the resources they would need to acquire and process the information or recognize from the outset that
obtaining the necessary information would be prohibitively expensive.245 Moreover, basic microeconomics tells us that information
asymmetries exist and are fairly common, obtaining information imposes costs, and, at the end of the day, contracting parties just do not
have equal access to information.246
But even if all the salient information about the relevant contract
clause or the contract in general was readily available, the “insert a
clause into the contract” solution also assumes a level of rational decision-making on the part of future adversely affected parties that simply does not exist. Behavioral psychology and behavioral law and
economics have told us for years now that contracting parties are not
rational actors when they decide to enter a contract.247 On the contrary, there is
242. See Rakoff, supra note 98, at 1177.
243. Id. at 1176–77.
244. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 214 (1995) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Limits].
245. Id.
246. See Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41
U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 50 (2011) [hereinafter Hart, Reality].
247. See generally Eisenberg, Limits, supra note 248, at 214–25. A thin version of
the rational actor is one in which the actor processes information about all available
options and then ranks those options in the order of subjective expected utility, where
expected utility is usually defined in terms of the actor’s own self-interest. See Hart,
Reality, supra note 246, at 48–49.
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a mass of experimental evidence[,] [which] shows the existence of
systematic cognitive problems affecting decision-making, such as
bounded rationality, which limits the future scenarios that actors
can be realistically expected to envision; overoptimism; and defects
in capability, including systematic underweighting of future benefits
and costs compared to present benefits and costs and systematic underestimation of low-probability risks.248

Compounding the problem with adhesive contracts is the widely
known fact that adhesive contracts already favor the drafting party
and sometimes unreasonably so. For example, Florencia MarottaWurgler’s research finds that standard terms in software license agreements were biased in favor of sellers (the party that drafted the
forms).249 Regarding online contracts, Nancy Kim argues that drafters
already make aggressive use of one-sided terms, such as mandatory
arbitration clauses with class action waivers (“sword” terms)250 and
perpetual licenses to user-generated content (“crook” terms),251 that
enabled the drafters of these contracts to obtain benefits that were
ancillary or unrelated to the main purpose of the contracts.252
Finally, even if all the salient information and requisite decisionmaking capacity were present, the future adversely affected party
would still have to be able to not only insist on the clause’s inclusion
in the contract but also ensure that the clause actually ends up in the
written document. This brings us full circle. Since most contracts are
adhesive, there is little likelihood that the future adversely affected
party could actually change anything about the contract to which it is
entering. This would obviously include the inability to insist on the
inclusion of a provision in the contract to protect itself against
changed circumstances that might occur later.
If everyone already knows all this, then I need to ask: Why do
courts and commentators all seem to agree that if an adversely affected party wants to excuse its future performance, then it needs to
include a provision in the contract to protect against future contingencies even though courts and commentators know that including such a
provision is pretty much impossible (pun intended) for the vast majority of contracting parties? What is really going on in the debate about
whether the CCDs should or should not excuse a party’s performance? The answer has to do with what a contract symbolizes in American society and the role it plays as a result.
248. Eisenberg, Impossibility, supra note 186, at 247; see also Russell Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1203, 1206, 1208–16 (2003).
249. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form
Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
447, 459–63 (2008).
250. KIM, supra note 208, at 48–50.
251. Id. at 50–52.
252. Id. at 4, 48–52, 58, 65–69, 70, 81.
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Contracts in the United States are synonymous with freedom and
individual responsibility, and they have embodied these values since at
least emancipation of the slaves in 1863.253 According to historian
Amy Dru Stanley:
In principle, contract reconciled human autonomy and obligation,
imposing social order through personal volition rather than external
force. To contract was to incur a duty purely by choice and establish
its terms without the constraints of status or legal prescription.254

The role of a contract, therefore, was to impose social discipline (i.e.,
to take complete responsibility for oneself) not just on the newly freed
slaves but also on everyone already in the country and those who
would later flock to our shores.255 Contracts became the legal space
within which individual autonomy was given full expression and the
commitment to private ordering was enshrined. This ethos of individual autonomy and responsibility and private ordering remains the
foundation of contract law today. As Dagan and Somech explain:
A genuinely liberal contract law conceptualizes contract as a plan
co-authored by the parties in the service of their respective goals.
Law’s justification for enforcing the parties’ agreement is grounded
in its commitment to enhance their self-determination, and both its
animating principles and its operative doctrines are guided by this
autonomy-enhancing telos.256

Thus, to ensure that contracts fulfill their role in American society,
pacta sunt servanda (contracts must be kept) becomes one of the important, if not the most important, cornerstones of contract law. Otherwise, if parties could just get out of their contracts, what would be
the value of a promise, particularly in a market economy257 where
everything and anything of value is transferred via a contract?258 Predictability and stability, the synergistic by-products of pacta sunt servanda, are then called upon to serve twin functions: first, to manage
the expectations of the parties and enable them to structure their affairs and facilitate planning for the future and, second, to continue to
inculcate the norms of autonomy and personal responsibility.
253. AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARMARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 35–37 (1998); see
also Priya Kandaswamy, The Obligations of Freedom and the Limits of Legal Equality, 41 SW. L. REV. 265, 266 (2012) ( “[R]ecognition as citizens [of the emancipated
slaves] worked to constrain and curtail . . . more expansive possibilities of freedom by
locking freedom for black people into an idiom defined by obligation, indebtedness,
and responsibility.”).
254. STANLEY, supra note 257, at 2.
255. Id. at 36–37; Kandaswamy, supra note 257, at 267–68; P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 654–55 (1979).
256. Dagan & Somech, supra note 180 (manuscript at 16).
257. Van Boom, supra note 33, at 1.
258. Eisenberg, Limits, supra note 248, at 212.
RIAGE, AND THE
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In this light, judicial allocation of the risks from changed circumstances through the CCDs is seen as interference with the parties’
freedom of contract, i.e., their autonomy to decide for themselves and
without any interference from the State whether to enter a contract
and on what terms. If one of the parties did not take the steps necessary to protect their interests in the contract, then the fault is theirs,
and all the risks associated with that party’s performance should be
allocated to that party, and any losses accruing as a result of a realized
risk should fall on that party who failed to adequately protect itself.259
Andrew Kull called this the “windfall principle.”260
Under this approach, therefore, contracts should be drafted without
the expectation of judicial intervention.261 This is because the only
role of the courts as agents of the State is to interpret and then enforce
the agreement of the parties as made.262 In other words, this approach
to contract law in general and the CCDs in particular draws a bright
line between what the State can do—enforce contracts as written—
and what it should not do—step in to excuse performance. Under this
view, to assign a different role to the State would not just impinge on
the parties’ autonomy it would also impermissibly interject the State
into the private ordering that contracts are supposed to guarantee.263
This stark distinction between what is the proper role of the State
(public) and what is not (private) is the bedrock upon which the entire
contract law system was constructed in this country.264 For that reason, it is also the crux of the CCD problem or question—depending
on your perspective.265 But more importantly, because a contract is
usually understood as a private transaction between two (or more)
private parties,266 the fact that contracts actually produce profound
social (i.e., public) consequences can and is ignored.
IV. PROPOSAL: INTERVENING WHEN IT MATTERS
The contract law system’s allegiance to the public/private distinction
demands that we pretend that the public aspect(s) of contracts and
contract law simply do not exist. But this is a legal fallacy because
259. Triantis, supra note 187, at 480.
260. Kull, supra note 33, at 6.
261. Jenkins, supra note 189, at 2020.
262. See Hart, Reality, supra note 246, at 29.
263. See generally Hart, Formation, supra note 44, at 184–89.
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Rapsomanikis, supra note 33, at 551 (“This problem [of changed circumstances] can be better viewed as a conflict between the principle of private autonomy, well expressed in the medieval maxim reservanda sunt pacta, and the modern
need of attributing a social function to private contracts . . . such as good faith, reasonableness and practicality.”); id. at 560 (“[C]ommon law views the contract as an instrument of liberalism and private autonomy, whereas civil law has ascribed a social
function to private agreements, which are thereby affected by extra-contractual
considerations.”).
266. Hart, Formation, supra note 44, at 184–89.
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reality shows us something else entirely. Notwithstanding the artificial
distinction between the public and the private that contract law clings
to, contracts and how contract law deals with contracts produce
profound social consequences. This is a fact. One need only look at a
newspaper (on paper or online), watch the news, or surf the Internet
to see the truth of the matter.267 Consequently, and specifically because contracts and contract law produce social, that is, public consequences, the State must step in. This is because the State is and always
has been free to act in public matters.
What if we were to reimagine contracts based on reality and what
we know about contracts and contracting in the real world instead of
on legal fictions like the notion that most contracts are drafted by
both parties? And what must we do or change to get there?
This Part attempts to sketch out some brief answers—not necessarily the answers or completely worked out answers—to these questions. Much more work needs to be done. But this is a starting point
....
The first thing that needs to happen is to actually acknowledge that
contracts and contract law produce social (i.e., public) consequences.
In essence, this step is a call to shift the frame from within which contract law is currently understood and analyzed. This may seem like a
trivial step to take but it is not. This is because “frames” are what
enable people to make sense of the world around them. Indeed, the
purpose of a “frame” and the process of “framing” is to create common meaning and shared understandings of the world and how it
works, which then legitimizes those meanings and the responses to
them.268 In short, by explicitly trying to influence what people think
and how they think about them, frames help shape reality.269 So, the
first step requires that we recognize that contracts and contract law at
a minimum implicate public law because of the social consequences
they produce. This first step will then legitimize both the State’s presence within the field and the State’s actions in response to the social
consequences that contracts and contract law produce.
The second step requires that we premise our understanding of how
contracts are created on the ways in which contracts are actually
formed in today’s world. And the ways in which a contract is actually
formed are critical because contract formation itself is the core of the
contract law system; this is where power in a contract is embedded
and becomes entrenched. This is so because (1) contract formation is
where the norms of autonomy, personal responsibility, and freedom
are given full effect—two private parties voluntarily come together in
their own self-interest to decide whether to enter into a contract and,
267. See supra Part I; see infra Part V.
268. Danielle Kie Hart, In a Word, 41 SW. L. REV. 215, 217 (2012).
269. See generally id. at 217–20.
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if so, on what terms; (2) contract law starts with the formation of a
contract—the rest of contract law (i.e., interpretation, defenses, remedies) are only triggered if a contract exists in the first instance; and,
most importantly, (3) at the moment of contract formation: a presumption of contract validity is created; and because this presumption
of contract validity is extremely difficult to rebut, the practical result is
that most contracts will be enforceable.270 Indeed, the empirical study
conducted for this Article validates this conclusion.
Thus, whatever happens or does not happen during contract formation, i.e., whether a term or clause is included in the contract or not,
will in effect determine the outcome of contract disputes later. According to Eisenberg, Triantis said as much when he wrote, “[I]f a
promisor agrees to render a certain performance, all risks affecting the
promisor’s ability to render that performance that are not specified in
the contract are contractually allocated to her.”271
Turning now to how contracts are formed in the real world, we
know, for example, that most contracts are adhesive, meaning that
only one party is drafting them.272 There is also no debate anymore
about whether people read the fine print in their contracts—they do
not. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan puts it this way, “one of the truisms of empirical contracts research is that ‘nobody reads.’”273 We also know
that even if people did read their contracts, they probably would not
understand what they read. This is because common-form contract
language is generally understandable by people with college degrees,274 which excludes a large number of contracting parties given
that “over 40 million adults are functionally illiterate [while] ‘another
50 million have marginal literacy skills.’”275 The extent of illiteracy is
worse when it comes to understanding numbers.276 But even assuming
people read their contracts and understand what they are reading,
there is little likelihood that they can change anything about the contracts they are entering into because most people entering into con-

270.
271.
272.
273.

Hart, Formation, supra note 44, at 199.
Eisenberg, Impossibility, supra note 186, at 247 (emphasis added).
See supra discussion accompanying notes 202–10.
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99
IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1751–53 (2014); see generally Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the
‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1 (2009).
274. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl. E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 712 (2011).
275. Id. at 711 (quoting Ad Hoc Comm. on Health Literacy for the Council on Sci.
Affs., Am. Med. Ass’n, Health Literacy: Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs,
281 JAMA 552, 552 (1999)).
276. Id. at 712 (“Rates of innumeracy are even worse than rates of illiteracy.”); see
also Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 429
(2011).
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tracts are not rational actors,277 and again, most of the contracts they
enter into are adhesive.278
If we acknowledged that contracts and contract law produce social
consequences, and if contract formation was premised on the ways in
which contracts are actually formed, then any number of different solutions could be considered. Two solutions are proposed here. The
first solution is roughly a rule of “interpretation” that would apply to
the types of adhesion contracts described in more detail below279 and
permit a judge or arbitrator to impose the risk and loss caused by a
catastrophic changed circumstance on the drafting party. If there is no
risk-allocation clause in the adhesion contract at issue, then the court
should interpret its absence against the drafting party and hold that
the drafting party should bear both the risk and loss because this is
exactly the contracting party that contract law presumes can and
should take care of itself. The drafting party, therefore, should be
forced to absorb all the costs associated with its failure to protect itself. That said, even if the adhesion contract at issue includes a riskallocation clause, the judge or arbitrator could and should still interpret the contract as imposing the risk and loss on the drafting party.
Given what we know about how contracts are formed in the real
world, a judge or arbitrator could, if she so chose, reasonably and legitimately conclude that the risk-allocation clause in the adhesion contract should not be given effect.
The second solution is one that focuses specifically on the CCDs
and is one already suggested by commentators and the courts, namely,
including clauses in the contract.280 The specific clauses suggested
here are a risk-and-loss-allocation clause (“RLAC”) and a good-faithnegotiation provision (“GFP”). Because it is not likely that the common law would adopt either of the proposed clauses,281 the RLAC
and GFP proposed here must be created under a federal statute. More
specifically, the proposed federal statute would require the following:
(1) the inclusion of a standard, negotiable, and variable RLAC together with a GFP in co-drafted contracts; and (2) the inclusion of a
standard, nonnegotiable, and non-variable RLAC (that includes the
risk of non-payment) together with a GFP in most adhesive contracts.
Because the world of contracting appears split into at least two types
of contracts—co-drafted and adhesive—the RLAC in particular
277. See supra discussion accompanying notes 247–48.
278. See supra discussion accompanying notes 202–10.
279. See infra discussion Part IV.
280. See supra discussion accompanying notes 201–09.
281. The common law is unlikely to adopt either of the proposed clauses given: (1)
its assumptions about contract formation, see supra discussion accompanying notes
225–34; (2) the fact that the implied obligation of good faith only applies to the performance and enforcement of contracts under American law, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTS. § 205 (AM. L. INST. 1981); and (3) the jurisprudence established
around the CCDs, see supra discussion accompanying pp. 9–11.
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would look and work differently depending on the type of contract at
issue. However, the RLAC in each of these contracting scenarios
would be triggered by catastrophic changed circumstances, like the
Great Recession or the COVID–19 pandemic.282
To state the obvious, a contract is “co-drafted” if each party to that
contract actually helped negotiate and draft it. But “co-drafting” cannot simply be presumed even in a commercial contract between commercial parties. This is because “co-drafting” presupposes that each
contracting party possesses a certain amount of bargaining power,
specifically, enough bargaining power to enable each party to know,
understand, and protect their interests during contract formation. So a
co-drafted contract would include, at a minimum, the following three
criteria.
First, both parties to the contract must either be represented by or
have actual access to third-party advisers during the negotiation and
drafting phase(s) of contract formation. This is because every contracting party has theoretical access to third-party advisers in that
every contracting party can theoretically hire a third-party adviser. An
attorney for anyone who wants one is a worthy aspiration. But it is not
at all clear (i.e., through any kind of evidence), that most people or
even a lot of businesses have the money to actually hire a third-party
adviser to help negotiate and draft their contracts. So “actual access to
third-party adviser(s)” means that the contracting parties have actually
hired a third-party adviser(s)283 or have the financial ability to hire a
third-party adviser(s) but have explicitly chosen not to do so. If the
latter option is taken, certified financial statements documenting that
the party who opted not to use a third-party adviser had the finances
available are sufficient to satisfy this criterion.
The second and most important criterion is that each contracting
party must have meaningful input into the terms that are included in
and excluded from the contract. While “meaningful input” and “actual
access to third-party advisers” seem similar and perhaps redundant,
they are not. “Meaningful input” recognizes that even if a contracting
party is represented by a third-party adviser, the contract at issue
could still be presented on a take it or leave it basis, depending on the
disparity in bargaining power between the contracting parties. Imagine, for example, a small parts supplier “negotiating” with Ford Motor
282. One could definitely argue that more circumstances short of catastrophic
should excuse performance under a risk-allocation clause or the CCDs. But what constitutes “normal risk”—risk that is reasonable for a contracting party to assume or be
made to assume—is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v.
NRG Energy, Inc., No. 03-C-2265, 2004 WL 2095554, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2004).
That said, there are certain kinds of risk, namely, risk created by unforeseen catastrophic circumstances, that make it simply unreasonable to think—let alone conclude—that a party somehow agreed to assume such risk when it entered the contract.
283. Hiring would include using personnel from within a contracting party’s own
company (i.e., from the legal, financing, or accounting departments).
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Company the terms of a supply contract or a restaurant owner “negotiating” with Wells Fargo for a commercial loan. The parts supplier
and restaurant owner could very well be represented by an attorney or
adviser in the negotiations. But it is certainly well within the realm of
possibility to also imagine that the parts supplier and restaurant owner
would have to accept whatever terms Ford or Wells Fargo insisted on
if the parts supplier or the restaurant owner really wanted the contract. To establish “meaningful input,” therefore, both parties would
have to submit declarations or affidavits attesting that they did in fact
have meaningful input into the drafting of the contract.284
The last criterion for a co-drafted contract is that the contract produced cannot be a standard form.285 In other words, the contract produced cannot be one that could be re-used in other transactions with
different parties with little to no modifications. Instead, the contract
produced must be specific and tailored to the transaction and parties
at issue.
At the end of the day, any contract between any contracting parties
could be a co-drafted contract provided that all three criteria are met.
In a co-drafted contract scenario, the contracting parties would be
subject to the mandatory, but variable, RLAC as well as the GFP. In
this situation, the RLAC would be automatically included in the parties’ contract unless they explicitly contract around it. The role of the
GFP would be to ensure that the negotiations about whether to keep
or remove the RLAC would be conducted in good faith. In other
words, the parties could decide for themselves whether to keep or
eliminate the RLAC and for what consideration. If the RLAC is left in
the contract, then the RLAC would determine the risk and loss allocation between the parties if catastrophic changed circumstances affect
future performance. But if the parties decide to eliminate the RLAC
from their contract, then this means that the parties have explicitly
adopted the CCDs as the default rules to sort out their future risk and
loss allocations. Here, courts, commentators, and the contracting public could safely assume that this co-drafted contract is the product of
voluntary agreement between parties who knew what they were doing. Thus, if the CCDs were later invoked in litigation, a court could
and should enforce the contract as written and allocate all the risk and
284. If one party is Ford Motor and the other is the small parts supplier, one can
plausibly argue that the parts supplier would attest to having meaningful input into
the drafting of the contract (even if it did not) to preserve its relationship or potential
relationship with Ford. While this practical consideration is true, whether the small
parts supplier will attest to meaningful input will really depend on the circumstances.
The existence of catastrophic circumstances, like the COVID–19 pandemic, could potentially cause the small parts supplier to go out of business because it cannot satisfy
its supply contract with Ford. That parts supplier might very well opt not to claim
meaningful input if meaningful input did not in fact occur.
285. This criterion should be obvious given that a standard form is one of the
hallmarks of an adhesion contract.
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loss onto the party that decided it did not need the protection of the
RLAC. In short, allocating risk and loss in this fashion (i.e., pursuant
to existing CCD case law) and under these circumstances (i.e., where
the parties to a co-drafted contract eliminated the RLAC from their
contract) would be the correct result.
Adhesion contracts are a different story. All adhesion contracts are
problematic because they call into question the voluntariness of each
of the transactions in which they are used.286 For this reason, it is very
tempting to argue that all adhesion contracts should include the
RLAC and GFP proposed here. But such a blanket approach is too
broad. Instead, the type of adhesion contracts that would include the
proposed contract provisions are mass contracts.
Mass contracts are adhesive contracts that when aggregated can potentially affect a significant part of an industry or sector of the economy.287 Consequently, the RLAC and GFP would be included in
contracts (1) drafted by (or primarily by) one party, where (2) the
drafting party is a repeat player, specifically, a party that enters into at
least 15 similar transactions a year, and (3) the contract is presented to
the non-drafting party on a take it or leave it basis (usually but not
necessarily on a standard form). Mass contracts therefore combine the
traditional indicia of an adhesion contract (one drafter + take it or
leave it basis) and an emphasis on a particular class of contract drafters (larger, repeat players).
So contracts with Ford Motor Company, for example, where Ford is
the paying party (i.e., supply contracts with parts suppliers) and the
performing party (i.e., manufacturing cars for sale to dealerships)
could qualify as mass contracts. The same would be true for contracts
with banks and financial institutions, large employers, and literally any
individual or business, provided that all three mass contract criteria
are satisfied.
This is how the proposed contract provisions would work in a mass
contract scenario. The RLAC in a mass contract would be mandatory
and non-variable, and it would explicitly and intentionally shift all the
risks and all the losses occasioned by the catastrophic changed circumstance to the drafting party. Consider the following example: A homeowner has a mortgage with Wells Fargo. The housing market crashes
sending the economy into a tailspin, causing the homeowner to lose
her job. Consequently, the homeowner can no longer make her mortgage payments, and she defaults on her mortgage. The non-variable
RLAC in the mortgage contract should excuse the homeowner’s duty
to pay the mortgage balance and instead shift the risk that the housing
286. Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 346-48 (2011).
287. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 631-32 (1943) (defining “mass standardized contracts” as “used in every bargain dealing with the same product or service”).
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market crashed and the loss in the form of the unpaid mortgage balance onto Wells Fargo.
The problem, of course, is that the homeowner could still lose her
home because she can’t keep the house without paying for it. This is
where the GFP would kick in to require the parties to negotiate in
good faith to modify their contract. The incentives for each party to
agree on a modification would be that the homeowner would get to
keep her house and Wells Fargo would not have to absorb all the unpaid mortgage balance and decreased market value of the house; instead, these losses would be shared. It is important to note here that
absent the RLAC, there would be no incentive for Wells Fargo to
modify the mortgage let alone negotiate in good faith for one; this is
because under existing contract law (i.e., no RLAC), all the risk and
loss engendered by the housing market crash would be shifted to the
homeowner.288 Granted, if the parties cannot reach an agreement to
modify the mortgage contract, the homeowner would still lose her
house. But she would not be liable for the unpaid mortgage balance as
she would be under current contract law. Instead, the loss would be
imposed on Wells Fargo.289
Since the RLAC would be non-variable, the mortgage contract itself should resolve the dispute between the homeowner and Wells
Fargo without the need for litigation. But if for some reason Wells
Fargo decided to sue the homeowner for defaulting on the mortgage,
then the RLAC in the parties’ contract would predetermine the outcome of the case. The court (or more likely the arbitrator) deciding
the case would be required to give effect to the RLAC, which would
mean excusing the non-drafting party’s performance per the CCD and
imposing the risk and loss on Wells Fargo, the drafter of the mass
contract. The CCDs would thus operate in this proposed mass contracting scenario exactly as they would under existing contract law,
namely, as doctrines that help the court determine and give effect to
the intentions of the parties as expressed in their contract. The main
difference, of course, is that under the proposed approach, all the risk
and loss would be imposed on the drafting party.
To be clear: Just as the shifting of risk and loss to non-drafting parties under existing contract law is deliberate, this shifting of the risk
and loss to the drafters of mass contracts is also an intentional policy
choice. There are two main reasons for this shift. First, the drafters of
288. See supra discussion accompanying notes 129, 131, 166–80 (discussing the difficulty paying parties have in excusing their performance under the CCDs). So under
existing contract law, the homeowner not only would lose her house to the bank but
also would be pursued by the bank for her unpaid mortgage debt until it was paid off.
289. Because the bank would get the house, the bank’s losses could be mitigated by
the value of the house the market dictates. If the market rebounds, the bank’s loss
from the unpaid mortgage balance would obviously be reduced. If the market does
not rebound and the value of the house remains low, the bank’s losses would be
compounded.
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mass contracts are the contracting parties that are likely better able to
absorb the risk and loss internally (because of their size) or through
insurance and/or to spread the risk by pooling it and pricing it uniformly into all similar contracts across their business(es).290 Second,
and assuming catastrophic changed circumstances have occurred, the
aggregated effects from these mass contracts will adversely affect the
economy (i.e., they will produce profound social consequences).291
Because the economy will be adversely affected by these aggregated
mass contracts, there is a much greater likelihood that the State would
step in to shore up the economy via Federal Reserve policy,292 a
bailout for the affected industry,293 a government insurance program,294 or some other measure(s). Some of, if not all, these measures
will usually redound to the benefit of the drafters of mass contracts.

290. Just as existing contract law assumes that all contracting parties could, if they
really wanted to, insist on the inclusion of clauses in the contract to protect themselves from future performance contingencies, see supra discussion accompanying
notes 201–09, the contracting model suggested here assumes that the drafters of adhesion contracts can—and do—take care of themselves in the market.
291. See supra discussion accompanying notes 17–23 (discussing the COVID–19
pandemic’s effects on the U.S. economy).
292. The Federal Reserve acted quickly and took several quick actions to shore up
the U.S. economy during the COVID–19 pandemic including, but not limited to: making $2.3 trillion in lending to support different sectors of the economy (state and local
governments, households, businesses); slashing interest rates to almost zero; and making a slew of asset purchases. Jeffrey Cheng et al., What’s the Fed Doing in Response
to the COVID–19 Crisis? What More Could It Do?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 30, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/fed-response-to-covid19/ [https://perma.cc/BTB4GMXP].
293. The federal government bailed out banks and the automotive industry during
the Great Recession by spending $426 billion “to stabilize the financial system and
prevent even more job losses” and $80 billion to bail out Chrysler and General Motors. Mitchell Hartman, What Did America Buy with the Auto Bailout, and Was It
Worth It?, MARKETPLACE (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/2018/11/13/
what-did-america-buy-auto-bailout-and-was-it-worth-it/ [https://perma.cc/GCJ6VCJA]. The federal government spent $426 billion “to stabilize the financial system
and prevent even more job losses” with $80 million to bail out Chrysler and General
Motors. Id.
294. Because most homeowners’ insurance does not cover flood damage, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (“FEMA”) manages the National
Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”). Flood Insurance/National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_
flood_insurancenational_flood_insurance_program_nfip.htm#:~:text=back
ground%3A%20The%20NFIP%20was%20created,Flood%20Insurance%20
Act%20of%201968.&text=this%20insurance%20is%20intended%20to,their%20contents%20caused%20by%20flood (Oct. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/UQQ9-V84G]. Specifically, NFIP was a direct response by Congress “to the lack of availability of private
insurance and continued increases in federal disaster assistance due to floods.” Id.
According to FEMA, “[t]he NFIP provides flood insurance to property owners, renters and businesses, . . . . The NFIP works with communities required to adopt and
enforce floodplain management regulations that help mitigate flooding effects.”
Flood Insurance, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/flood-insurance (May 26, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/L5TF-M5EE].
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In short, focusing on mass contracts and forcing the drafters of
these contracts to absorb all the risks and all the losses associated with
catastrophic changed circumstances is a specific attempt to trigger
when necessary the State’s systemic responses to the adverse social
consequences those catastrophic circumstances create.295 And if this
result became reality, the State would effectively protect both contracting parties. That is, as a specific result of its systemic actions, the
State would end up protecting the drafters of mass contracts; and as a
specific result of the State action in the form of the proposed federal
statute, the RLACs and GFPs would protect the non-drafting parties.
Significantly, and from the more granular perspective of contract
and contract law, contracts—both mass and co-drafted—would remain predictable, stable, and efficient. This is because contracting parties would know in advance exactly how the risks and losses
engendered by future catastrophic changed circumstances would be
allocated between them under the contract and, if initiated, in litigation. This knowledge should increase trust between contracting parties
in general, which would not only encourage further contracting but
would also permit contracting parties to structure their present and
future transactions accordingly. In terms of contract law itself, the
presence of the RLAC and GFP in these contracts would paradoxically either make the CCDs unnecessary, because the contract would
resolve the dispute before litigation, or more successful if litigation is
filed, because the RLAC would predetermine the outcome of the
cases in which a CCD is raised.
Of course, the devil is always in the details. Where would the federal statute needed to make the RLAC and GFP a reality even come
from? How would it be worded? Could the RLAC in particular be
drafted to eliminate foreseeability issues that come up in CCD litigation?296 How much would and could non-drafting parties charge for
the non-variable RLAC and GFP in mass contracts? Would that fee
be capped and, regardless, would there be a subsidy for qualified nondrafting parties to pay that fee? Should restitution be available and, if
so, when?
None of these questions are simple or easily answered, nor do they
exhaust the field. Clearly a lot of work would need to get done to
295. Systemic responses would be triggered when necessary because unless the
losses from the aggregated mass contracts end up adversely affecting the economy,
the drafters of the mass contracts would have to absorb all of those losses themselves—unless, of course, the drafters can negotiate loss-sharing modifications with
the non-drafting parties.
296. In Aleut Enterprise, LLC v. Adak Seafood, LLC, for example, there was a
force majeure clause in the contract. No. 3:10–cv–0017–RRB, 2010 WL 3522348, at *2
(D. Alaska Sept. 2, 2010). According to the court, the force majeure clause made the
event at issue in the case foreseeable because it specifically mentioned the event. The
court held on that basis that the adversely affected party’s performance was not excused. Id.
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create the RLAC and GFP proposed in this Article. With that in
mind, a healthy dose of legal realism is required here. The reality is
that the RLAC, GFP, and other solutions like it won’t ever be
adopted unless and until the public aspects of contracts and contract
law are acknowledged. That first step—shifting the frame—is the
hardest one. That said, given the extent of the inequality and injustice
that the COVID–19 pandemic has exposed across American society,
there may be a chance to take this first step.
V. CONCLUSION
As of January 10, 2022, there were 60,240,751 confirmed
COVID–19 cases and 835,302 COVID–19-related deaths in the
United States.297 Heartbreaking evictions are taking place all over the
country.298 Experts predicted for months that without more stimulus
money from Congress, “millions of Americans could be evicted, in the
dead of winter, in the middle of a raging pandemic.”299 An August
report by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that “the
number of active Black small-business owners fell 41% from February
through April (nearly twice the rate of non-Black-owned businesses),
as many struggled to access programs like the Paycheck Protection
Program.”300 Yet another news story reports that more Americans fell
into poverty after the federal stimulus programs ended, “particularly
Black Americans, children[,] and those with a high school education
or less.”301
297. Sergio Hernandez et al., Tracking COVID-19 Cases in the US, CNN, https://
www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/health/coronavirus-us-maps-and-cases/ (Aug. 21, 2021,
5:45 PM) [https://perma.cc/W7PJ-7ERJ].
298. See, e.g., Randy Mac, Man Left Homeless in Pandemic After Eviction from
Apartment He Lived in for 20 Years, NBC, https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/coronavirus/coronavirus-pandemic-homeless-eviction-los-angeles/2415612/ (Aug. 20,
2020, 6:38 AM) [https://perma.cc/73U9-32GR] (Los Angeles); Matt Levin et al., Exclusive: More than 1,600 Californians Have Been Evicted During Pandemic, CAL MAThttps://calmatters.org/housing/2020/08/californians-evicted-coronavirusTERS,
pandemic/ (Sept. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JFL7-WLUH] (examining COVID–19
evictions in California); Teresa Wiltz, As COVID-19 Tanks the Economy, Eviction
Moratoriums Expire, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Aug. 6, 2020), https://
www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/08/06/as-covid-19tanks-the-economy-eviction-moratoriums-expire [https://perma.cc/P5KV-3ECQ] (discussing the response to eviction moratoriums expiring throughout the United States).
299. Chris Arnold, COVID-19 Relief Bill Could Stave Off Historic Wave of Evictions, NPR (Dec. 24, 2020, 6:15 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/24/949668850/
covid-19-relief-bill-could-stave-off-historic-wave-of-evictions [https://perma.cc/7X388KRK].
300. Anne Sraders & Lance Lambert, Nearly 100,000 Establishments that Temporarily Shut Down Due to the Pandemic Are Now Out of Business, FORTUNE (Sept. 28,
2020, 9:25 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/09/28/covid-buisnesses-shut-down-closed/
[https://perma.cc/F9U3-4UCT].
301. Tami Luhby, More Americans Fall into Poverty After Federal Stimulus Programs End, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/15/politics/poverty-congress-
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Clearly, we are no longer talking about what’s “coming down the
pike” because all the misery created by the COVID–19 pandemic is
already here. And contracts are in the thick of it. Unfortunately, contracts and contract law will never alone solve any of the systemic issues plaguing our country. Systemic relief must come from the State.
That said, we ignore contracts and contract law at our peril because
they both play an integral role in the creation and perpetuation of
inequality in American society. The economic devastation caused by
the COVID–19 pandemic exposes this. Thus, the real question, the
only question that probably matters at this moment, is whether this
exposure will finally force us to acknowledge the public aspects of
contracts and contract law. If so, then contracts and contract law can
serve as an important part of the solution to some of the most pressing
problems confronting us today. If not, then so many of these
COVID–19 spawned losses will simply be left to lie where they fall.
coronavirus-stimulus/index.html (Oct. 15, 2020, 4:41 PM) [https://perma.cc/5JSU2M8T].
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